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I. Introduction
On his way home from the hospital with his newborn son, a
hit-and-run accident left Jeremy Lew with a severely injured
spine.1 Lew underwent surgery, during which his doctor implanted
a device approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
between his cervical vertebrae.2 The treatment initially appeared
successful, but Lew later began suffering from “unrelenting” pain,
barely able to pick up his children.3 Although the FDA approved
the device, the agency intended it for use only in the mid-to-lower
spinal column.4 The off-label use of the medical device caused Lew
1. See Brian Krans, The Debate Over “Off-Label” Drug Use, HUFFINGTON
POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-debate-over-off-label-druguse_us_588bce2ee4b0cd25e49048b2 (last updated Jan. 30, 2017) (last visited Feb.
18, 2018) (discussing the Lew accident and subsequent treatment) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See Jim Spencer, Patients Who Received Medtronic’s Infuse Product to
Get $8.45 Million in Settlements, STARTRIBUNE (Aug. 2, 2016, 8:25 PM),
http://www.startribune.com/patients-who-received-medtronic-product-to-get-845-million-in-settlements/388947831/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (reporting that
Lew’s doctor implanted the “cage device” to hold a synthetic bone growth product
in place) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. Krans, supra note 1; see also Spencer, supra note 2 (“Lew ended up with
unwanted bone growth in [his spine] that caused nerve damage.”).
4. See Spencer, supra note 2 (“Lew’s spine surgery involved placement of
Infuse in his neck, where the FDA had warned it could cause nerve and breathing
problems.”).
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unimaginable pain as a result of his nerve injury, and could have
further caused sterility, infection, or urinary problems.5
Nonetheless, the practice of using medications and medical devices
for unapproved treatments continues.6
Advocates of off-label medication use tout highly successful
treatments that have saved lives even when approved treatments
have failed.7 For example, after doctors diagnosed Lisa Rosendahl
with a glioblastoma—a highly lethal brain tumor—they estimated
that she would live for only another twelve months.8 Rosendahl’s
doctor suggested she try chloroquine, a drug indicated for treating
malaria and never before used for this type of illness, on the theory
that the drug would make the tumor more vulnerable to existing
treatments.9 Ultimately, chloroquine—in conjunction with the
continued use of existing treatments—stabilized the tumor, and
this use of the drug has since seen similar results in two other
patients.10 This type of last-ditch effort understandably occurs in
the treatment of otherwise fatal conditions, but off-label
medication use commonly helps patients with less threatening
illnesses as well.11
5. See Sheila Kaplan, Whistleblower Case Contends Surgical Device Maker
Misled FDA—and Patients Paid the Price, STAT (Aug. 15, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/2016/08/15/medtronic-medical-device-surgery-fda/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (listing injuries reported by more than 6,000 people
who have sued Medtronics over the faulty device) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
6. See infra Part III (discussing the current use of medications for off-label
purposes).
7. See Dana Dovey, Glioblastoma Treatment Breakthrough: ‘Untreatable’
Brain Cancer Tumor Stabilized with Malaria Drug, MED. DAILY (Jan. 17, 2017,
1:44 PM), http://www.medicaldaily.com/glioblastoma-treatment-breakthroughuntreatable-brain-cancer-tumor-stabilized-408668 (last visited Feb. 8, 2018)
(detailing the successful off-label use of a malaria drug for the treatment of a
brain tumor) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See id. (explaining that glioblastomas are notoriously difficult to treat).
9. See id. (noting that doctors thought chloroquine might disable the
tumor’s defenses).
10. See id. (boasting clinical benefits in all three patients).
11. See, e.g., Lawrence T. Park et al., Evaluation and Treatment of Poor
Sleep, 9 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 224, 226 (2007)
(pointing to Tylenol PM and Nyquil for their off-label treatment of insomnia). For
another example sure to arouse your interest, see James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal,
Off-label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer Liability for Unapproved
Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295, 298 (2003) (discussing
how Viagra originally received approval as a treatment for chest pain before
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Typically, the FDA weighs a medication’s benefits against
potentially harmful side effects as part of its New Drug Application
(NDA) process, established by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA).12 Reserving enforcement of off-label medication
promotion to the expertise of the FDA, however, has proved
somewhat unsuccessful.13 Because FDA enforcement creates a
chilling effect on manufacturers’ advertising, pharmaceutical
companies have successfully challenged agency enforcement
actions as violations of their First Amendment rights.14 After
facing several challenges to its regulations, the FDA reduced the
severity of its sanctions in an effort to avoid future lawsuits, but
recent lower-court decisions have reinforced the notion that the
FDA lacks a sufficient governmental interest to regulate this form
of commercial speech.15
As an alternative, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act16 allows
private companies to sue their competitors for false or misleading
advertising.17 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in POM
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,18 however, has cast some doubt
on pharmaceutical companies’ ability to challenge the promotion
of products approved by the FDA.19 Although the Court held that
doctors began prescribing it for the then off-label treatment of erectile
dysfunction).
12. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938). See Leonard V. Sacks et al., Scientific and Regulatory Reasons for Delay
and Denial of FDA Approval of Initial Applications for New Drugs 2000–2012,
311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 378, 379 (2014) (explaining that manufacturers must
provide evidence of a drug’s safety and efficacy before the FDA will approve it).
13. See infra Part III.A (discussing First-Amendment challenges to the
FDA’s regulation of off-label drug promotion).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“Caronia argues that he was convicted for his speech—for promoting an
FDA-approved drug for off-label use—in violation of his right of free speech under
the First Amendment. We agree.”).
15. See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d
196, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that the FDA narrowed its interpretation of the
FDCA while Caronia was on appeal).
16. United States Trademark Act (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat.
427 (1946).
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (codifying the elements for a Section
43(a) claim).
18. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).
19. See generally id. (holding that the FDCA does not preclude Lanham Act
claims challenging food and beverage labels, but leaving open the possibility that
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the FDCA does not preclude challenges to food and beverage labels
brought under the Lanham Act, courts have since recognized
preclusion in limited situations involving drug labels.20 Thus, this
Note seeks to address whether the current approaches to FDA
preclusion of Lanham Act claims effectively bar competitors’
actions under Section 43(a), and, if so, whether courts should
establish an exception for claims involving the promotion of
off-label medication uses.
Part II provides a more in-depth background of the statutes at
issue, along with a discussion about how POM Wonderful has
helped create this potential dilemma.21 The Note then explores
recent trends in litigation under both the FDCA and the Lanham
Act to demonstrate how the two statutes complement each other
in the regulation of off-label promotion.22 Part III summarizes
current arguments regarding the efficacy of off-label medication
use and attempts to determine what level of regulation will best
serve the public.23
Ultimately, the Note argues that the promotion of off-label
drug uses does not fit neatly into the current framework for
statutory preclusion that courts have established after POM
Wonderful.24 Thus, the question remains whether the FDCA
precludes, or should preclude, Lanham Act claims that seek to
challenge false or misleading promotion of off-label medication
uses.25 Part IV analyzes off-label promotion under the current
preclusion framework to highlight potential problems in
application.26 Part V then argues that while Lanham Act claims
FDA regulations may preclude drug-related claims).
20. See infra note 30 (citing to post-POM Wonderful decisions that have
barred Lanham Act claims out of deference to the FDA).
21. See infra Part II (describing the history of the FDCA and Lanham Act).
22. See infra Parts III.A–B (focusing on First Amendment challenges to the
FDA’s regulations and whether the FDA’s drug regulations preclude Lanham Act
claims).
23. See infra Part III (introducing statistics about current off-label
medication use).
24. See infra Part IV (outlining two approaches to preclusion that courts
have applied since POM Wonderful).
25. See infra Part IV (applying post-POM Wonderful methods of preclusion
to off-label promotion).
26. See infra Part IV (noting the difficulty of applying current approaches to
off-label promotion).
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typically cannot challenge a product regulated under the FDA’s
drug enforcement authority, recent applications of POM
Wonderful should not extend to Lanham Act claims challenging
manufacturers’ promotion of drugs for off-label uses.27
II. A Comparison of the FDCA and the Lanham Act, and Their
Application in POM Wonderful
Although the FDCA and Lanham Act largely serve different
purposes, courts previously struggled to find a balance between the
“misbranding” provisions of the FDCA and false advertising
challenges under the Lanham Act.28 The Supreme Court
eventually provided a definitive statement of the statutes’
complementary nature in the regulation of food and beverage
labeling in POM Wonderful.29 Nonetheless, courts continue to face
confusion as they attempt to apply POM Wonderful to cases
involving more highly regulated products—specifically, drug labels
and advertising.30

27. See infra Part V (suggesting a return to the reasoning of POM
Wonderful).
28. See, e.g., PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010)
(reasoning that private parties cannot bring a Lanham Act claim that would
require a court to litigate an underlying violation of the FDCA); Schering-Plough
Healthcare Prods. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2009)
(dismissing plaintiff’s claim because the relief sought would amount to a label
change requiring FDA approval); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
443 F. Supp. 2d 453, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (acknowledging the lack of a private
right of action under the FDCA but, nonetheless, permitting a claim brought
under Section 43(a)).
29. See generally POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228
(2014) (addressing whether the FDCA’s regulation of food and beverage labels
precludes Lanham Act claims against manufacturers of food and beverage
products).
30. See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 64 (2d
Cir. 2016) (“[R]epresentations commensurate with information in an FDA [drug]
label generally cannot form the basis for Lanham Act liability.”); JHP Pharm.,
LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 998–1000 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (considering
whether the Supreme Court intended POM Wonderful to apply to drug labels);
see also Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH, 843
F.3d 48, 63 (2d Cir. 2016) (“We see no reason why the subjugation of Defendant’s
[medical device] labeling to FDA regulation . . . should categorically immunize it
from Lanham Act claims by competitors . . . .”).
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A. FDCA
The first major attempt at regulating food and drugs came in
1906 through the enactment of the Food and Drugs Act.31 In an
effort to quell a spike in the interstate shipment of adulterated
foods, Dr. Harvey Wiley, then Chief Chemist for the Department
of Agriculture, lobbied for the federal act using results of
experiments showing the harmful effects of certain food
additives.32 Though this first legislation provided only weak
guidance, it established a basis for later national food and drug
regulation.33 Not until 1938, however, did drug manufacturers
need approval before marketing their medications.34
The FDA attributes its new drug process in part to the
marketing of elixir sulfanilamide, a toxic remedy for streptococcal
infections developed in 1937 by S.E. Massengill Co.35 After
receiving requests for a liquid form of sulfanilamide, the drug’s
manufacturer mixed the existing compound with diethylene
glycol—a chemical now used in antifreeze.36 Because no federal
regulation existed to ensure the safety and effectiveness of
medications before marketing, the new liquid medication resulted
in over one hundred deaths throughout the United States that

31. See 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHARINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION § 3:1, Westlaw (database updated June 2017) (noting that
Congress had passed several laws attempting to control imported food items, but
otherwise left responsibility of regulating adulterated food and drug products to
the states).
32. See id. § 3:2 (explaining that the experiment tested common food
additives and preservatives on volunteer human subjects).
33. See id. (characterizing Wiley’s proposal as “a weak and administratively
cumbersome statute, flawed in significant details,” but “a dramatic step forward
in consumer protection”).
34. See Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937
Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER MAG., June 1981 (observing that
it was the 1938 FDCA that increased the FDA’s regulation of drugs).
35. See id. (describing the agony patients faced as a result of taking the
elixir).
36. See id. (noting that the company did test the elixir for “flavor,
appearance, and fragrance and found it satisfactory”).
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year.37 Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the 1938 Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.38
Though the FDCA continues to evolve, the purpose remains
the same: “to protect the health and safety of the public at large”
by enabling the FDA to promulgate regulations that seek to
eliminate fraud and false claims in the labeling and advertisement
of products under its jurisdiction.39 While food and cosmetics
certainly pose health risks, however, it appears drugs have
received substantially more attention from the FDA, as Congress
has continued to expand the FDCA in ongoing efforts to protect the
public from harmful medications.40 Noted FDCA scholar James
O’Reilly highlights several Supreme Court cases that additionally
solidify judicial deference to the FDA in the context of drug
regulation.41 Two of these cases, Wienberger v. Hynson, Westcott &
Dunning, Inc.42 (Hynson) and United States v. Rutherford,43 have
significant relevance here.44 Hynson established the FDA’s
“virtually unreviewable authority to determine whether a product
was or was not a ‘new drug’ and thus within the FDA’s regulatory
jurisdiction.”45 A few years later, the Court confirmed this
authority in Rutherford by stating that “[u]nless and until
37. See id. (stating that while there was no law illegalizing the selling of toxic
drugs at the time, it “was, undoubtedly, bad for business”).
38. See id. (suggesting that the incident did not merely hasten the FDCA’s
enactment, but led to the regulation of new drugs).
39. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2234 (2014); see
also O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 31, § 14:1 (listing some of the methods
through which the FDCA impacts drug safety); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (“To prohibit the movement in
interstate commerce of adulterated and misbranded food, drugs, devices, and
cosmetics, and for other purposes.”).
40. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2235 (noting the difference between
drug and food regulations).
41. See James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century:
Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 939, 943–45 (2008) (providing a brief history of the cases that have expanded
deference to the FDA).
42. 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
43. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
44. See O’Reilly, supra note 41, at 944 (commenting on how these cases
granted the FDA substantial authority over drug regulations).
45. Id.; see also Hynson, 412 U.S. at 627 (“[The FDA’s] jurisdiction to
determine whether it has jurisdiction is as essential to its effective operation as
is a court’s like power.”).
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Congress [corrects the Court’s misinterpretation of the FDCA], we
are reluctant to disturb a longstanding administrative policy that
comports with the plain language, history, and prophylactic
purpose of the Act.”46 Essentially, these cases reflect the Supreme
Court’s unwillingness to interfere with FDA expertise in the realm
of drug regulation.47 POM Wonderful arguably provides yet
another example of this deference through the Court’s
caveat-in-dictum, distinguishing the strict regulation of drugs
from the agency’s more relaxed approach to food and beverages.48
In addition to broad discretion over new drug applications,
Congress provided the FDA sole enforcement authority over the
FDCA and FDA regulations.49 Rather than relying merely on the
post hoc methods of enforcement used in food and beverage
regulation, however, Congress mandated that the FDA approve
medications and labels before marketing.50 The agency also retains
post-approval methods of enforcement such as warning letters or
enforcement actions against manufacturers, which it may use to
police misbranding of medications, unapproved drugs, or other
unsafe practices as defined by either the statute or FDA
regulations.51 Through these enforcement actions, the FDA can
assign criminal or civil liability resulting in monetary fines,

46. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 554.
47. See O’Reilly, supra note 41, at 944 (suggesting that Hynson and
Rutherford granted the FDA the power to determine its own jurisdiction over drug
regulation).
48. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2014)
(“[T]he FDA does not preapprove juice labels. That contrasts with the FDA’s
regulation of other types of labels, such as drug labels, and is consistent with the
less extensive role the FDA plays in the regulation of food than in the regulation
of drugs.” (citation omitted)).
49. See 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2012) (“[A]ll such proceedings for the
enforcement . . . of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United
States.”). The FDA has allowed petitions by either citizens or “interested persons”
if they believe another party has violated the statute or regulations. See 21 C.F.R.
§§ 10.25, 10.30 (2017) (setting out rules for such petitions).
50. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (requiring that “[n]o person shall introduce or
deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug” until the drug
receives preapproval by the FDA).
51. See O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 31, § 7.1 (providing a brief
overview of the FDA’s enforcement methods); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 835–38 (1985) (establishing the FDA’s broad prosecutorial discretion).
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injunctions, exclusion from the market, or withdrawal of drug
approval.52
As a part of the premarket approval process, the FDCA and its
accompanying regulations require drug labels to include certain
efficacy information for every intended use of the drug, and the
FDA will refuse an application if it discovers any “misbranding.”53
Misbranding occurs, for example, when a drug’s label or
advertising contains false or misleading information, or when the
label does not include adequate warnings and directions for use.54
Consequently, the FDA has prohibited the promotion of drugs for
off-label uses, or those uses for which the drugs have not received
approval.55 For example, because off-label drug promotion
advertises unintended uses, for which the labels do not contain
adequate directions, the FDA has used such promotion as evidence
of mislabeling under the FDCA.56 This prohibition, however, has
led to a dispute over whether the FDA’s interpretation violates
drug manufacturers’ First Amendment rights.57
In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,58 the seminal
case challenging FDA limitations on unapproved promotion, the
Supreme Court held that the FDA could not prohibit the
advertisement of compounded drugs.59 Thompson arose from the
FDA’s attempt to prohibit a process through which pharmacists
would combine drugs to tailor their effects to the needs of
individual patients.60 To prevent harmful side effects, the FDA
52. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333, 335a–c (detailing the penalties available
through FDA enforcement actions).
53. See id. § 331(b) (prohibiting misbranding).
54. See id. § 352 (defining when a drug will be considered “misbranded”).
55. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2012)
(deciding that the FDA’s evidentiary use of off-label promotion to prove
misbranding under the FDCA was an attempt to criminalize the act of off-label
promotion).
56. See id. at 160 (“Specifically, the government argues that . . . ‘the
promotion of off-label uses plays an evidentiary role in determining whether a
drug is misbranded under 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1).”’).
57. See id. at 168 (holding that the FDA cannot prosecute manufacturers for
truthful off-label promotion).
58. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
59. See id. at 377 (invalidating the speech-related provisions of the Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 503A as unconstitutional).
60. See id. at 360–61 (describing the process and purpose of drug
compounding).
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monitored the promotion of these compounded medications until
Congress officially criminalized advertising by the pharmacists in
the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
(FDAMA).61 The Supreme Court recognized the utility of such a
ban in “[p]reserving the effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s
new drug approval process,” but it rejected the notion that the FDA
could regulate this commercial speech.62 Citing the government’s
concurrent interest in ensuring access to necessary medical
treatment, the Court held that the FDA’s prohibition “does not
appear to directly further any asserted governmental objective.”63
Since Thompson, the FDA has encountered additional challenges
to its regulations under the First Amendment. This Note revisits
the FDA’s struggle to find an appropriate regulatory approach to
the promotion of off-label medications in Part III.64
B. Lanham Act Section 43(a)
At the time of its conception, the Lanham Act purported to
create a broad federal law proscribing unfair competition,65 with
Section 43(a) focusing on protecting consumers from the deception
of false advertising.66 Although the drafters of the Lanham Act
intended Section 43(a) to play a minor role in the legislation,67 a
wave of cases by creative plaintiffs’ attorneys in the 1970s and ‘80s
made it the primary vehicle for protecting consumers from false

61. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-115, 111 Stat. 2296; see also Thompson, 535 U.S. at 363–65 (noting that the
FDA and the FDAMA did not allow pharmacists to promote compounded drugs).
62. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 369.
63. Id. at 377.
64. See infra Part III.A (detailing several cases in which courts struck FDA
regulations for violating the First Amendment).
65. See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 27:7, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017) (adding that courts
have since declined to recognize the Lanham Act as a comprehensive federal
unfair competition law).
66. See id. § 27:25 (noting that the broad protections of Section 43(a) lead to
several advantages not provided by the common law).
67. See id. § 27:7 (explaining that the original draft of Section 43(a) was
intended only to “ease the restrictive requirements of proof in the common law
false advertising cases”).
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advertising.68 Accordingly, Congress amended Section 43(a) in
1989, officially broadening its scope and splitting the provision into
two separate “prongs”: infringement and false advertising.69
While the statute creates a cause of action for “[a]ny person,”70
courts have determined that only competitors may bring claims
under the statute, leaving consumers to rely on private companies
to police these unfair trade practices.71 Considering, however, that
“competitors have the greatest interest in stopping misleading
advertising, . . . and in many situations . . . the greatest resources
to devote to a lawsuit,”72 the lack of standing for an individual to
sue should not lessen the protection provided to consumers. While
unfair practices undoubtedly harm consumers, competitors’
interests in recovering lost profits or enjoining misleading
advertising adequately fulfill Congress’s intent “to protect persons
engaged in such commerce against unfair competition.”73
To state a prima facie claim for false advertising, competitors
must plead with the requisite specificity74 that the defendant has
used, for the purpose of advertising or promoting in interstate
commerce, any false or misleading information that
“misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin” of their, or a competitor’s, product.75 Plaintiffs must further
demonstrate that they have been or likely will be damaged by
these acts.76
68. See id. § 27:8 (detailing the expansion of Section 43(a) by courts).
69. See id. § 27:9 (observing that before Congress rewrote Section 43(a), both
potential claims stemmed from the same language, which prohibited “false
designation of origin” and “false description or representation”).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012).
71. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1377, 1388–90 (2014) (“A consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a
disappointing product may well have an injury-in-fact cognizable under Article
III, but he cannot invoke the protection of the Lanham Act . . . .”); Barrus v.
Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that standing requires
commercial injury “harmful to the plaintiff’s ability to compete with the
defendant,” which excludes individual claims).
72. Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
74. See MCCARTHY, supra note 65, § 27:24 (noting that some courts require
more specific pleading for false advertising based on the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) standard for claims of fraud).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
76. See Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1384 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) to
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Successful claims may result in either preliminary or
permanent injunctive relief based upon the likelihood or actual
presence of harm, and could include a requirement of corrective
advertising to inform consumers of the false or misleading
claims.77 In addition to injunctive relief, plaintiffs may recover the
defendant’s profits from the unfair marketing campaign, damages
sustained by the plaintiff, and costs of litigating.78 Further, while
plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages under the Lanham Act,
“[a] court may enter judgment . . . for any sum above the amount
found as actual damages, not exceeding three times such amount,”
allowing some variance for inadequate or excessive rewards.79
Even though the Lanham Act seeks to deter unfair
competition, courts have hesitated to allow competitors to bring
claims against products regulated by the FDCA.80 Some courts
reasoned that if a product’s labeling met the requirements of the
FDCA, which sought to prevent the sale of adulterated or
misbranded products, then any Lanham Act challenge would
inevitably conflict with the FDCA.81 Others, however, would allow
claims that did not require interpretation or application of the
highlight the elements of damage and proximate cause).
77. See MCCARTHY, supra note 65, § 27:37 (describing available injunctive
relief and the burdens plaintiffs face to obtain such remedy).
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (including attorney fees “in exceptional
cases”).
79. See id. (noting that any variation shall not serve as punitive damages,
but as compensation to the plaintiff).
80. See, e.g., Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics,
GmbH, 843 F.3d 48, 73 n.13 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing that Lanham Act claims
generally cannot challenge FDA labels); Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc.,
823 F.3d 51, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) (suggesting that barring Lanham Act claims that
challenge drug labels reflects an appropriate deference to the FDA); Alpharma,
Inc. v. Pennfield Oil Co., 411 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 2005) (declining to apply the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1139
(4th Cir. 1993) (dismissing a claim of misrepresentation because plaintiffs
improperly sought to enforce the FDCA); Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v.
Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 230–32 (3d Cir. 1990) (questioning whether
allowing a Lanham Act challenge to defendant’s drug label would usurp the FDA’s
authority); JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 998–1000 (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (establishing a presumption that Lanham Act claims may challenge
products regulated by the FDA).
81. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir.
2012) (deferring to the expertise of the FDA by dismissing a claim challenging a
drink label that appeared to comply with FDA regulations), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2228
(2014).
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FDCA or FDA regulations.82 This disagreement reached its peak
when the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the debate in POM
Wonderful v. Coca-Cola.83
C. A Comparison of the Lanham Act and the FDCA in
POM Wonderful
In 2014, the Lanham Act and the FDCA collided after
Coca-Cola began marketing its new pomegranate-blueberry
juice.84 While Coca-Cola’s label contained the words “pomegranate
blueberry” in large font and all capital letters, along with a
vignette that showed blueberries, grapes, raspberries, and a
halved pomegranate, the juice itself contained only 0.3%
pomegranate juice and 0.2% blueberry juice.85 POM Wonderful
LLC (POM), a competitor of Coca-Cola as a grower and distributor
of pomegranate juices, sued Coca-Cola under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.86 POM challenged the label as misleading, explaining
that consumers “have no way on God’s green earth of telling that
the total amount of blueberry and pomegranate juice in this
product can be dispensed with a single eyedropper.”87
Coca-Cola contested the suit, asserting that the FDCA’s
prohibition on misbranded food and drinks and the juice label’s

82. See PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010) (barring
a Lanham Act claim as an attempt to enforce the FDCA); Schering-Plough
Healthcare Prods. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2009)
(suggesting that a direct conflict between a Lanham Act claim and FDA
regulations may create a preclusive effect).
83. See generally POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228,
2234 (2014) (resolving whether the FDCA precludes a Lanham Act challenge to a
food or beverage regulation).
84. See id. at 2235 (laying out a summary of the facts).
85. See id. (“Below those words, Coca-Cola placed the phrase ‘flavored blend
of 5 juices’ in much smaller type.”).
86. See id. (“POM alleged that the name, label, marketing, and
advertising . . . mislead consumers into believing the product consists
predominantly of pomegranate and blueberry juice when it in fact consists
predominantly of less expensive apple and grape juices.”).
87. See Oral Argument at 15:23, POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134
S. Ct. 2228 (2014) (No. 12-761), https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts
6/oral_argument_audio/23517 (adding that “[i]t amounts to a teaspoon in a half
gallon”).
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compliance with FDA regulations precluded POM’s claim.88 The
District Court granted partial summary judgment for Coca-Cola,
explaining that “the ‘FDA has directly spoken on the issues that
form the basis of POM’s Lanham Act claim against the naming and
labeling of’ Coca-Cola’s product, but has not prohibited any, and
indeed expressly has permitted some, aspects of Coca-Cola’s
label.”89 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, reasoning that
“the Lanham Act may not be used as a vehicle to usurp, preempt,
or undermine FDA authority.”90
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties tasked the Court
with choosing between competing canons of statutory
interpretation.91 POM suggested that courts “give full effect to both
statutes unless they are in ‘irreconcilable conflict,’” whereas
Coca-Cola sought to have the more specific FDCA narrow the scope
of the Lanham Act.92 The Court declined to accept either
argument.93 Instead, it first searched both the FDCA and the
Lanham Act for a provision expressly limiting their coequal
application before considering whether the statutes were

88. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2239 (pointing to a congressional goal
of “national uniformity in food and beverage labeling”). When discussing
preclusion of one federal statute’s cause of action by another federal statute, the
Note uses the term “statutory preclusion.” This is not to be confused with
legislative preclusion of judicial review in the context of administrative law. See
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 12.5 (2d ed.
2001) (detailing generally the limitations to judicial review of agency action
through express legislative statements included in organic statutes).
89. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2236 (quoting POM Wonderful LLC v.
Coca-Cola Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 849, 871 (C.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 679 F.3d 1170 (9th
Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014)).
90. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir.
2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).
91. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2236–37
(2014) (explaining that the problem of competing interpretive maxims is not
unique to POM Wonderful).
92. Id. at 2237.
93. See id. (noting that the “Court does not need to resolve this dispute”
because, in either case, the FDCA does not preclude POM’s claim). Although the
Court declined to apply either rule in POM Wonderful, it hinted at the idea that
a direct conflict between the statutes would create a preclusive effect. See id. at
2240 (“Because, as we have explained, the FDCA and the Lanham Act are
complementary and have separate scopes and purposes, this greater specificity
would matter only if the Lanham Act and the FDCA cannot be implemented in
full at the same time.”).
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conflicting or complementary in nature.94 Through this approach,
the Court determined that the FDCA does not expressly preclude
the Lanham Act, and that, instead, the two statutes complement
each other through their distinct scopes and purposes.95 Moreover,
the Court warned that the ability of the FDA’s sole enforcement
power to police unfair market practices pales in comparison to the
expertise of market competitors.96
Ultimately, however, the Court narrowed its holding to food
and beverage regulations, leaving open the possibility that the
FDCA might still preclude Lanham Act claims challenging
products more heavily regulated by the FDA, such as drugs.97
Significantly, labels for drugs and some medical devices require
preapproval by the FDA, which involves a detailed description of
the products’ quality, safety, and effectiveness, and a review of the
proposed labeling.98 Because the FDCA and its accompanying
regulations involve a more comprehensive examination of the
claims made by pharmaceutical companies as compared to those

94. See id. at 2237–38 (pointing to the lack of an express provision as
‘“powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the
exclusive means’ of ensuring proper food and beverage labeling” (quoting Wyeth
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009))).
95. See id. at 2241 (rejecting Coca-Cola’s preclusion argument because
“Congress did not intend the FDCA to preclude Lanham Act suits like POM’s”).
96. See id. at 2238 (“The FDA, however, does not have the same perspective
or expertise in assessing market dynamics that day-to-day competitors
possess. . . . [Competitors’] awareness of unfair competition practices may be far
more immediate and accurate than that of agency rulemakers and regulators.”).
97. See id. at 2233 (“[T]he FDCA and the Lanham Act complement each
other in the federal regulation of misleading food and beverage labels.”); see also
Andrew Baum, Supreme Court Holds that Lanham Act False Advertising Claims
Are Not Preempted by FDCA, HEALTH CARE L. TODAY (June, 20, 2014),
https://www.healthcarelawtoday.com/2014/06/20/supreme-court-holds-thatlanham-act-false-advertising-claims-are-not-preempted-by-fdca/ (last visited
Feb. 18, 2018) (observing that “the Court might take a different view if drug
labeling were at issue”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
98. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012) (listing requirements for preapproval of
drugs through the FDA’s NDA process); FDA Regulation of Drugs Versus Dietary
Supplements, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, https://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatmentsand-side-effects/complementary-and-alternative-medicine/dietarysupplements/fda-regulations.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2015) (last visited Feb.
18, 2018) [hereinafter FDA Regulation] (outlining the approval process of new
drugs, and the conditions placed on the manufacturer by the FDA) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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made by food and beverage manufacturers,99 the FDA sees fewer
instances of mislabeling.100 Nonetheless, lower courts have
continued to rely on pre-POM Wonderful precedent for
drug-related cases, demonstrating an unwillingness to interfere
with FDA regulations.101
For example, in Perez v. Nidek Co.,102 the Southern District of
California dismissed state-law claims of unfair competition against
a defendant medical device promoter, noting that “it was not
proper for a district court to ‘usurp administrative agencies’
responsibility for interpreting and enforcing potentially
ambiguous [FDA] regulations.’”103 Though Perez did not involve the
Lanham Act, courts resolving state-law claims have typically
relied on the same precedent that formed the basis of post-POM
Wonderful preclusion arguments.104 Similarly, the Central District
of California has held that “insofar as Plaintiffs’ claims are based
solely on allegations that Defendants promoted [their drug] for
off-label purposes, they constitute an impermissible attempt to

99. See FDA Regulation, supra note 98, at 5–7 (comparing regulation of
drugs versus dietary supplements, which more closely resembles food).
100. See Comments on FDA Enforcement of Drug Advertising Regulations,
PUB. CITIZEN (Oct. 28, 2002), http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=3336#_ftnref3
(last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (showing a decline in the number of drug enforcement
actions after the FDA began regulating the advertising of unapproved drug and
medical device uses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see
id. (expressing concern over the insufficient number of employees available to
review advertisements).
101. See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 64, 64 n.9
(2d Cir. 2016) (barring Lanham Act claims challenging statements consistent
with FDA-approved labeling (citing Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
443 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))); JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F.
Supp. 3d 992, 999–1005 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (suggesting that primary jurisdiction,
affirmative policy decision, conflict with an FDA-preapproved labeling scheme,
and potentially drug labels in general may require preclusion (citing PhotoMedex,
Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2010))); Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera
Med. Corp., No. 2:14-CV-70-TC, 2014 WL 3536573, at *6 (D. Utah July 17, 2014)
(leaving enforcement of the FDCA to the FDA (citing PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin,
601 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2010))).
102. 657 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (S.D. Cal. 2009).
103. Id. at 1165 (quoting Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902
F.2d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 1990)).
104. See, e.g., id. at 1165 (citing PhotoMedex, Inc. v. RA Med. Sys. Inc., No.
04CV24JLS (CAB), 2007 WL 3203039 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2007), aff’d sub nom.,
PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2010)).
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bring a private suit for violations of the FDCA.”105 The court
continued, however, to say that if “Plaintiffs can identify specific
representations . . . that are literally false, misleading or contain
material omissions, the claims are actionable” under California’s
consumer fraud laws.106
Conversely, the Eighth Circuit allowed a Section 43(a) claim
where the manufacturer of a drug approved to treat only
hypertension advertised its product as a “miracle drug” for the
treatment of angina.107 Likewise, the Southern District of New
York has held that although “courts have rejected attempts . . . to
create a private cause of action to challenge a manufacturer or
distributor’s sale of an FDA approved drug for off-label use,”
certain claims involving false assertions of FDA approval could
proceed.108 Thus, it appears that whether the FDCA or FDA
regulations preclude Lanham Act claims challenging off-label
promotion remains largely undecided, as courts vary on how
strictly they apply POM Wonderful.
III. The Rise of Off-Label Medication Use and Issues
Inhibiting Regulation
As the stories of Jeremy Lew and Lisa Rosendahl illustrate,
the potential gain from off-label drug use might offset many of the
associated public health risks, but such use could also result in
devastating pain and suffering.109 These conflicting results have
led to a substantial debate among both lawyers and medical
professionals about the safety of off-label treatments.110 Studies
105. In re Epogen & Arenesp Off-Label Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 590 F.
Supp. 2d 1282, 1292 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
106. Id.
107. See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 93
F.3d 511, 513 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding the finding that defendant violated the
Lanham Act).
108. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 443 F. Supp. 2d 453, 460
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing PDK Labs v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105 (2d Cir. 1997);
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130 (4th Cir. 1993)).
109. See supra Part I (discussing Lew’s nerve damage and the life-saving
treatment of Rosendahl, both resulting from off-label treatments).
110. See Teresa Carr, Off-Label Use: Should Drugs Do Double Duty?,
CONSUMER REP. (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.consumerreports.org/drugs/off-labeluse-should-drugs-do-double-duty/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (reporting that drug
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have shown that off-label uses account for approximately 20% of
all prescribed treatments,111 and that up to about 75% of those
medications lack scientific evidence of efficacy.112 In some cases,
these uses provide hope for otherwise helpless patients, targeting
cancers or rare diseases that may have no existing treatments.113
As such, supporters of off-label use seek to increase the availability
of drugs and efficacy data for unapproved uses.114
companies seek to relax rules about off-label use and promotion while consumers
typically want the FDA involved to prevent misleading advertising) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
111. See Tracy Hampton, Experts Weigh in on Promotion, Prescription of
Off-Label Drugs, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 683, 683 (2007) (“21% of the 725 million
total drug prescriptions reported . . . lacked FDA approval for the condition they
were used to treat.”); Timothy O’Shea, 10 Surprising Off-Label Uses for
Prescription
Medications,
PHARMACYTIMES
(Jan.
5,
2016),
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/contributor/timothy-o-shea/2016/01/10surprising-off-label-uses-for-prescription-medications (last visited Feb. 18, 2018)
(“It is estimated that up to 20% of all medications prescribed are for indications
that are not approved by the FDA.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the
Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008) (“[F]or the 3 leading
drugs in each of the 15 leading drug classes, off-label use accounted for
approximately 21% of prescriptions.”).
112. See Carr, supra note 110 (“[M]ore than 80 percent of off-label prescribing
by doctors lacked strong scientific evidence.”); Hampton, supra note 111, at 683
(“[Seventy-three percent] of off-label uses lacked evidence of clinical efficacy, and
only 27% were supported by strong scientific evidence.”); Stafford, supra note 111,
at 1427 (“[M]ost off-label drug uses (73%) were shown to have little or no scientific
support.”); Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common Questions (and Their
Answers) About Off-Label Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 982, 983 (2012)
(“[Seventy-three percent] of medications prescribed for an off-label use had poor
or no scientific support.”).
113. See Hampton, supra note 111, at 1427 (“[Fifty percent] to 75% of all uses
of drugs in cancer care in the United States are off-label . . . . [A]pproximately
90% of patients with rare diseases are given at least one drug that is off-label.”);
see also Kelli Miller, Off-Label Drug Use: What You Need to Know, WEBMD (2009),
http://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/features/off-label-drug-use-what-you-needto-know#1 (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“According to the American Cancer Society,
cancer treatment often involves using certain chemotherapy drugs off-label,
because a chemotherapy drug approved for one type of cancer may actually target
many different types of tumors.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
114. See Stafford, supra note 111, at 1427 (acknowledging that off-label
promotion gives doctors and patients the benefit of “earlier access to potentially
valuable medications”). See generally James M. Spears et al., Embracing 21st
Century Information Sharing: Defining a New Paradigm for the Food and Drug
Administration’s Regulation of Biopharmaceutical Company Communications
with Healthcare Professionals, 70 FOOD DRUG L.J. 143 (2015) (arguing for a
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Not all uses stem from a lack of alternative treatments,
however, and some result merely from incomplete clinical
testing.115 For example, “three fourths of the prescription drugs on
the market do not have labeling indications for children, leaving
their use in children to physicians’ discretion.”116 Psychiatric
medications also often lack sufficient clinical data, as “[p]atients
with psychiatric disorders are often excluded from clinical trials,
and these disorders are inherently difficult to study.”117 So, while
some off-label uses might treat otherwise untreatable conditions,
opponents of off-label use suggest that the benefits do not outweigh
the potential negative side effects of using a medication with
limited clinical efficacy information.118 Instead, they argue that the
promotion of such uses serves only to increase profits of the
pharmaceutical companies.119 As such, they push for increased
regulation and postmarket enforcement of prohibitions on off-label
use and promotion.120
relaxation of FDA regulation of off-label promotion, among other things, so that
physicians can receive the most recent information about the medications they
prescribe and to avoid violating First Amendment rights).
115. See Hampton, supra note 111, at 683 (explaining that treatments can be
difficult to test on some populations).
116. Id.
117. Wittich et al., supra note 112, at 983; see also Hampton, supra note 111,
at 683 (noting that 96% of the off-label uses of psychiatric prescriptions had little
or no support—the greatest disparity in support of studied medications); Susan
Ipaktchian, 14 Drugs Identified as Most Urgently Needing Study for Off-Label
Use,
Stanford
Professor
Says,
STAN.
MED.
(Nov.
24,
2008),
https://med.stanford.edu/news/all-news/2008/11/14-drugs-identified-as-mosturgently-needing-study-for-off-label-use-stanford-professor-says.html
(last
visited Feb. 18, 2018) (listing fourteen drugs in need of clinical testing for off-label
use, nine of which are most commonly used to treat psychiatric disorders) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Stafford, supra note 111, at 1427
(observing that 60% of antipsychotics are prescribed off-label).
118. See Carr, supra note 110 (“[P]atients were 54 percent more likely to
experience some kind of harm . . . compared with those taking the same drug for
an approved use.”); O’Shea, supra note 111 (“[T]he rate of side effects for off-label
drugs was 44% higher than on-label ones.”).
119. See Carr, supra note 110 (suggesting that, contrary to pharmaceutical
companies’ claims, their ultimate goal is “to sell products”).
120. See id. (observing that “allowing drug companies to distribute off-label
marketing materials . . . isn’t helpful because it’s likely to be biased,” and
“consumers want the FDA involved” so they know of any side effects and of the
efficacy of suggested uses); Hampton, supra note 111, at 684 (“Experts note that
changes may be needed. ‘It might be helpful to adopt a more aggressive
postmarket surveillance system, and that could be done using data collected
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Certainly, the FDA should attempt to regulate the negative
effects of off-label prescribing; but, at some point, the benefit from
unapproved use likely outweighs the risk. Two issues have gained
momentum over recent years that will ultimately play a role in
determining the best method for regulating off-label promotion:
First, the FDA’s efforts to criminalize the misbranding of drugs by
companies marketing them for off-label uses have led to litigation
over First Amendment violations, as the regulations limit
manufacturers’ ability to promote their products.121 Second, courts
have distinguished POM Wonderful’s holding—that the FDCA
does not preclude the Lanham Act—when Section 43(a) claims
challenge medication labels.122 When viewed together, the two
issues create a potential paradox: FDA drug regulations preclude
Lanham Act claims, but the FDA cannot effectively punish
manufacturers who peddle drugs for off-label uses.123 Thus, the
best method of regulating off-label promotion might be to carve out
an exception to the modern application of POM Wonderful in order
to allow competitors to sue under Section 43(a), effectively
supporting the FDA’s goal of protecting consumer safety.
A. Pharmaceutical Companies Challenge FDA Regulations as
Violating the First Amendment
Although the FDCA does not expressly prohibit off-label drug
marketing, the FDA has interpreted the statute’s misbranding
by other players in the healthcare system—for instance, insurance companies or
HMOs . . . .’”); Stafford, supra note 111, at 1429 (warning against a relaxation of
FDA regulations, and recommending that the agency “take an active role in
fostering evidence-based practice . . . and requiring a balanced and fair
presentation of scientific evidence”).
121. See infra Part III.A (summarizing recent First-Amendment challenges
to FDA regulations).
122. See infra Part III.B (outlining post-POM Wonderful approaches to
preclusion in the context of drug labels).
123. See infra Parts III.A–B (detailing these two issues). If the information in
a promotion or advertisement is false, both methods may provide legal recourse;
however, courts have interpreted the phrase “false and misleading” differently for
the FDCA and the Lanham Act. See Kathryn Bi, Comment, What is “False or
Misleading” Off-Label Promotion?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 975, 999 (2015) (arguing
that courts should interpret “false or misleading” uniformly across statutes with
this language).
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provisions to criminalize the practice.124 Attempts to enforce the
criminal provisions, however, have led to several recent court
decisions admonishing the regulations as violations of the First
Amendment.125 The Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson
signaled the beginning of a decrease in FDA enforcement authority
by holding that criminal prosecution for advertising compounded
drugs did not directly advance a substantial governmental
interest.126 But, even after the FDA amended its sanctions in an
effort to prevent future constitutional challenges, the agency has
largely continued its criminal prohibition on off-label promotion of
medications.127 Despite the FDA’s shift in regulations, the
Supreme Court found in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.128 that
“[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of
expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.”129 Moreover, the conflicting government interests
asserted in Thompson remain, as some pharmaceuticals have
124. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(j) (2008) (considering off-label promotion to be
misbranding under the FDCA); United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153–55
(2d Cir. 2012) (outlining the FDA’s argument that off-label promotion of a
medication amounts to evidence of misbranding because the drug’s label does not
include adequate directions for the unapproved use); In re Epogen & Aranesp
Off-Label Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1288 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (providing a detailed roadmap of relevant FDCA and FDA rules through
which the agency has sought to prohibit off-label promotion).
125. See, e.g., Caronia, 703 F.3d at 152 (agreeing with appellant that his
conviction for promoting an off-label use violated the First Amendment); Amarin
Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (“Amarin claims that the FDA’s threat of a misbranding action is chilling it
from engaging in constitutionally protected truthful speech.”); see also Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011) (declaring a Vermont law
unconstitutional because it limited the ability of pharmaceutical manufacturers
to engage in protected speech); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357,
377 (2002) (striking speech-related provisions of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 as unconstitutional for prohibiting
promotion of compounded drugs without directly furthering a government
interest).
126. See Thompson, 535 U.S. at 369 (noting that the government has
competing interests of “[p]reserving the effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s
new drug approval process” and “permitting the continuation of the
practice . . . so that patients with particular needs may obtain medications suited
to those needs”).
127. See Amarin Pharma, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 207–08 (discussing the FDA’s
attempt to limit Amarin’s promotion under the agency’s narrower regulations).
128. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
129. Id. at 557.
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commonly known and effective off-label uses.130 As the government
has conceded, “because obtaining FDA approval for a new drug is
a costly process, requiring FDA approval . . . for the particular
needs of an individual patient would, as a practical matter,
eliminate the practice . . . and thereby eliminate availability
of . . . drugs for those patients who have no alternative
treatment.”131 Consequently, the FDA has recently faced
additional challenges to its regulation of off-label drug
promotion.132
In United States v. Caronia,133 the Second Circuit overturned
the conviction of a pharmaceutical representative for off-label
promotion and ruled that the FDA’s prosecution violated the First
Amendment.134 Orphan Medical, Inc. hired Alfred Caronia to
promote Xyrem, a central nervous system depressant used to treat
narcolepsy patients with cataplexy135 or excessive daytime
sleepiness.136 Because of Xyrem’s side effects,137 the FDA required
130. See Thompson, 535 U.S. at 368 (weighing the government’s interests in
preserving the integrity of the NDA process and maintaining access to
individualized drug treatments unavailable through FDA-approved uses);
Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166–67 (examining the government’s interests in preserving
the “integrity of the FDA’s drug approval process and reducing patient exposure
to unsafe and ineffective drugs” while recognizing that the FDA has
acknowledged the benefit of off-label use and promotion); see also U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
RELATED TO MANUFACTURER COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING UNAPPROVED USES OF
APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL PRODUCTS 3 (2017) (asserting eleven government
interests that seem to be covered broadly by those asserted in Thompson and
Caronia).
131. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 369 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 19, Thompson
v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (No. 01-344)).
132. See supra note 125 (providing examples of challenges to the FDA’s
regulations).
133. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
134. See id. at 169 (concluding that “the government cannot prosecute
pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives under the FDCA for
speech promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug”).
135. See id. at 155 (defining cataplexy as “a condition associated with weak or
paralyzed muscles”).
136. See id. (noting that the two different uses of the drug were approved at
different times, showing that off-label uses may eventually qualify for approval).
137. See id. (“Xyrem can cause serious side effects, including difficulty
breathing while asleep, confusion, abnormal thinking, depression, nausea,
vomiting, dizziness, headache, bedwetting, . . . sleepwalking[,] . . . seizures,
dependence, severe withdrawal, coma, and death. Xyrem’s active
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the drug to carry a “black box” warning138 and limited its
distribution.139 After launching an investigation of Orphan
Medical, Inc., the FDA recorded a conversation in which Caronia
promoted Xyrem for “insomnia, Fibromyalgia[,] periodic leg
movement, restless leg, . . . Parkinson’s and . . . other sleep
disorders.”140 In later meetings, Caronia also offered evidence of
safe use in patients younger than the population approved by the
FDA.141
The court began its discussion by acknowledging the validity
of the FDA’s regulation prohibiting mislabeling, but ultimately
determined that the agency could not use commercial speech as
evidence of a violation of that regulation.142 Under the agency’s
interpretation of the FDCA, off-label promotion evidences a
company’s intended use of the promoted drug.143 As such, the
agency sought to categorize a drug as mislabeled when the
manufacturer advertised a use other than those indicated on the
label.144 The court distinguished mislabeled medications from
off-label promotion, finding that “the government clearly
prosecuted Caronia for his . . . speech.”145
As the Second Circuit analyzed the FDA’s prohibition, it
applied the heightened scrutiny owed to content-based
restrictions, but suggested that this application of the regulation

ingredient . . . has been federally classified as the ‘date rape drug . . . .’”).
138. See id. (“The black box warning is the most serious warning placed on
prescription medication labels.”).
139. See id. (allowing only one pharmacy to distribute the medication across
the United States).
140. Id. at 156 (alteration in original).
141. See id. at 156–57 (quoting Caronia as stating, “[T]here have been reports
of patients as young as fourteen using it”).
142. See id. at 161–62 (suggesting that the use of Caronia’s speech as evidence
of misbranding effectively amounted to the FDA’s prosecution of speech).
143. See id. at 160 (“[T]he government argues that ‘[p]romoting an approved
drug for off-label uses is not itself a prohibited act under the FDCA’ and ‘the
promotion of off-label uses plays an evidentiary role in determining whether a
drug is misbranded under 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1).’” (second alteration in original)
(quoting Gov’t Br. 51)).
144. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4) (2008) (“An advertisement . . . shall not
recommend or suggest any use that is not in the labeling accepted in such
approved new-drug application or supplement . . . .”).
145. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2012).
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would fail even an intermediate-scrutiny test.146 The court noted
that the prohibition failed to advance directly a government
interest as required for the government to limit protected
speech.147 Though the FDA sought to “preserv[e] the efficacy and
integrity of the FDA’s drug approval process and reduc[e] patient
exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs,” the agency also knew
“that approved drugs [would] be used in off-label ways.”148 The
court found that this contradictory approach “interferes with the
ability of physicians and patients to receive potentially relevant
treatment information,” inhibiting the public’s ability to make
informed treatment decisions.149
Several years after Caronia, Amarin Pharma, Inc. (Amarin)
sought review in the Southern District of New York for
“preliminary relief to ensure its ability to engage in truthful and
non-misleading speech free from the threat of a misbranding
action.”150 In Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug
Administration,151 the plaintiff presented a list of disclosures about
off-label uses of its drug Vascepa that the company intended to
disseminate to medical professionals.152 Along with test results
suggesting the safety and efficacy of the drug, Amarin agreed to
release statements disclaiming that the medicine had not received
FDA approval for the suggested uses.153 The court, citing the same
146. See id. at 164 (“[W]e conclude the government cannot justify a criminal
prohibition of off-label promotion even under Central Hudson’s less rigorous
intermediate test.”). But see id. at 182 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (finding no
reason to overturn Caronia’s conviction, and noting that “the majority’s decision
today extends heightened scrutiny further than the Supreme Court ever has”).
147. See id. at 167 (“[T]he government’s prohibition of off-label promotion by
pharmaceutical manufacturers ‘provides only ineffective or remote support for
the government’s purpose.’” (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 504–05 (1996))).
148. Id. at 166.
149. Id.; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 130, at 26
(acknowledging that the FDA’s interest are “sometimes competing”).
150. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196,
198 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
151. 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
152. See id. at 212 (seeking a judgment that the FDA cannot keep the
pharmaceutical company “from making completely truthful and non-misleading
statements about its product to sophisticated healthcare professionals”).
153. See id. at 215 (listing five disclosures that would inform medical
professionals of the lack of FDA approval and other potential downsides to the
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conflicting interests present in Thompson and Caronia, found that
the FDA could not prosecute Amarin based on the presented
statements.154 Ultimately, the parties agreed that Amarin could
promote the drug in a truthful and nonmisleading way.155
By acknowledging the potential validity of mislabeling
prohibitions, courts have established that misbranding remains
actionable, although the evidentiary use of truthful speech likely
does not.156 How much the agency will compromise on its effective
prohibition, however, remains unclear.157 In November of 2016,
after facing defeat in both Caronia and Amarin, the FDA
considered another shift from its strict prohibition on off-label
promotion to avoid violating the First Amendment.158 The
drug’s off-label use).
154. See id. at 237 (granting Amarin preliminary relief).
155. See Deborah Mazer & Gregory Curfman, FDA Sanctions Off-Label Drug
Promotion,
HEALTH
AFF.
BLOG
(July
19,
2016),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/07/19/fda-sanctions-off-label-drug-promotion/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (reporting that the FDA ultimately settled with
Amarin, in part because the agency had worked with the drug company to develop
the medication, and Amarin could promote it based “almost entirely on
statements by the FDA itself”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
156. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 167 (2d Cir. 2012) (“While
some off-label information could certainly be misleading or unhelpful, this case
does not involve false or misleading promotion. . . . [I]t only furthers the public
interest to ensure that decisions about the use of prescription drugs, including
off-label usage, are intelligent and well-informed.” (citations omitted)).
157. See Elizabeth Graham Minerd, Guest Post—Midnight Madness—The
FDA Continues to Discount First Amendment Implications of Restrictions on
Off-Label
Promotion,
JD
SUPRA
(Jan.
27,
2017),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/guest-post-midnight-madness-the-fda-60305/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (suggesting that cases like Caronia have not deterred
the FDA from prosecuting even truthful off-label promotion) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
158. See Ryan Basen, FDA Mulls New Policy on Off-Label Promotion,
MEDPAGETODAY (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealth
policy/fdageneral/61323 (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (discussing a public hearing
hosted by the FDA to hear comments on whether and how the agency should
regulate off-label promotion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Liz Minerd, Guest Post – The FDA’s Two-Day Meeting on Manufacturer Off-Label
Communications, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.drugand
devicelawblog.com/2016/11/guest-post-the-fdas-two-day-meeting-onmanufacturer-off-label-communications.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2018)
(summarizing comments made for and against increased regulations during the
FDA’s two-day meeting on November 9–10, 2016) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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following January, the FDA released a memorandum that seemed
to double down on the agency’s current approach of prohibiting
off-label promotion, rather than relaxing its regulations.159 After
dismissing alternatives to regulation,160 the memorandum merely
restated the FDA’s current approach,161 while leaving open the
possibility that the regulations may change under the Trump
administration.162
B. POM Wonderful’s Application to Drug-Related Claims
When the Supreme Court found that the Lanham Act and
FDCA complemented each other in POM Wonderful, it essentially
dismissed any future arguments that the FDCA precludes Lanham
Act claims.163 As a result, if the Court intended FDA preapproval
to bar Section 43(a) claims, it must have envisioned a different
conflict necessitating such a bar.164 Yet, courts attempting to
159. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 130, at 21 (maintaining the
agency’s argument that “the government’s reliance on speech as evidence of
intended use under the FD&C Act does not infringe the right of free speech under
the First Amendment”); see also Minerd, supra note 157 (“[T]he Agency concludes
that the restrictions on off-label promotion advance substantial government
interests . . . and are therefore constitutional . . . . The Agency dismisses the
Second Circuit’s contrary analysis of the off-label promotion restrictions . . . in
United States v. Caronia . . . .”).
160. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 130, at 26 (“Although many of
these proposed approaches address one or more of the interests identified above,
FDA is concerned that none of them appear to integrate the complex mix of
numerous, and sometimes competing, interests at play and thus do not best
advance those multiple interests.”).
161. See id. at 22 (arguing that the FDA does not prohibit off-label speech, but
merely uses speech as evidence to establish an element of the agency’s prohibition
on misbranding). But see Nathan Brown, FDA Offers Some Clarity (But Few
Concessions) on Off-Label Communication of Medical Products, JD SUPRA (Jan.
30, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fda-offers-some-clarity-but-few12036/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“With its pair of draft guidance documents,
FDA slightly broadens the scope of permissible communications related to
approved or cleared medical products . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
162. See Minerd, supra note 157 (noting that the comment period for changes
in FDA regulations closes April 2017).
163. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2240 (2014)
(stating that the statutes’ separate scopes and purposes allow courts to implement
them at the same time).
164. See, e.g., id. at 2241 (leaving available the possibility of preclusion when
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reconcile the Supreme Court’s narrow holding in POM Wonderful
with precedent that recognizes broad deference to the FDA have
demonstrated little disagreement over how POM Wonderful
applies to Lanham Act claims involving drugs.165 Rather, a
consensus seems to have formed among courts that deference to
the FDA’s strict drug regulation might create a preclusive effect in
limited circumstances.166 Ultimately, this has led to some conflict
about when, but not whether, drug regulation under the FDCA
bars Section 43(a) claims.167
Judicial deference to the FDA in this area of regulation is vital
to the agency’s continued success, as a lack of consistent deference
may dilute the agency’s authority in the eyes of those regulated by
the FDA.168 In the context of drugs and medical devices, which
have a large impact on public health and safety, an agency’s
inability to regulate effectively could lead to disastrous results.
Considering the onus placed on manufacturers to keep their
labeling accurate as new efficacy data becomes available,169 the
FDA must command respect from pharmaceutical companies.170
a lawsuit would undermine an agency judgment or policy (citing Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000))); see also JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira,
Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 999 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (contending that the Supreme Court
intended preclusion in cases where an agency provided multiple options for
manufacturers to reach compliance with regulations or where a Lanham Act
claim would conflict with an affirmative FDA policy judgment like preapproval).
165. See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 64 (2d
Cir. 2016) (“[R]epresentations commensurate with information in an FDA label
generally cannot form the basis for Lanham Act liability.”).
166. See id. at 64 n.10 (“Lanham Act liability might arise if an advertisement
uses information contained in an FDA-approved label that does not correspond
substantially to the label, or otherwise renders the advertisement literally or
implicitly false.”).
167. Compare Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics,
GmbH, 843 F.3d 48, 73 n.13 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing only limited
circumstances in which FDA action precludes Lanham Act claims), with JHP
Pharm., 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (suggesting that claims involving drug labeling
may be broadly precluded).
168. See O’Reilly, supra note 41, at 942 (arguing that a lack of judicial
deference to agencies leads regulated entities to “deem the agency less potent”).
169. See supra Part II.B (discussing the FDA’s ability to withdraw approval
of drugs and medical devices based on noncompliance with agency regulations).
170. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2016) (outlining the FDA’s reapproval of drugs
and medical devices after manufacturers make label changes to update safety
information).
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Importantly, this is not to say that the FDA may override
congressional acts through its powers of rulemaking and
enforcement.171 Rather, it is a recognition that courts intended to
yield to the FDA’s broad authority in the area of drug and medical
device approval, and that decisions requiring interpretation of the
FDA’s regulations are best left to the agency’s expertise.172 As the
Supreme Court established in POM Wonderful, the FDA’s
regulation of food and beverage labels set a base level of
requirements for manufacturers.173 But, when the FDA takes an
active role in preapproving a label, rather than passively listing
required information that manufacturers may satisfy with a wide
array of vignettes, the agency creates a greater possibility of direct
conflict with the Lanham Act.174 In those cases, courts should give
greater weight to the agency’s expertise and enforcement power.175
Thus, considering that the Court broadly declined to find a
statutory conflict, yet alluded to the possibility that more stringent
FDA procedures may bar Lanham Act claims, the logical
conclusion is the existence of some sort of preclusion based on
deference to agency expertise.176 Although the Supreme Court has
171. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2241 (2014)
(“An agency may not reorder federal statutory rights without congressional
authorization.”).
172. See O’Reilly, supra note 41, at 942 (“A historic strength of the FDA has
been the deference received from courts during enforcement actions; indeed, the
FDA has long nurtured its aura of expertise in order to win the accommodating
acceptance of judges.”).
173. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2240 (noting that Congress did not
intend the FDCA to act as a ceiling on the regulation of food and beverage labels).
174. See JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1000 n.5 (C.D.
Cal 2014) (identifying the common requirement in the Supreme Court’s
preclusion analysis as “positive regulatory action” by the FDA).
175. See id. at 1003 (suggesting that determining whether a defendant
misleadingly represents a product as “safe” or “effective” may require resolution
by the FDA); see also Par Sterile Prods., LLC v. Fresenius Kabi USA LLC, No. 14
C 3349, 2015 WL 1263041, at *4 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2015) (agreeing with JHP
Pharm. that some cases involving “complex inquiry” into matters of FDA
expertise may be precluded); Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Med. Corp., No.
2:14-CV-70-TC, 2014 WL 3536573, at *6 (D. Utah July 17, 2014) (deferring to the
FDA to resolve whether updates to an FDA-approved label requires reapproval in
order to avoid misleading consumers).
176. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2241 (suggesting that a direct conflict
with an agency’s policy may warrant preclusion to avoid undermining the
agency’s judgment).
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shown considerably high regard for FDA expertise, it is highly
unlikely that the Court intended to create an outright ban in
Hynson or Rutherford on any claims involving the agency—
especially considering that the legislature never took such
action.177 Instead, several post-POM Wonderful cases demonstrate
a more plausible reason for this deference by attempting to
reconcile the Supreme Court’s holding with its caveat-in-dictum
concerning FDA preapproval.178 Similar to POM Wonderful, these
cases acknowledge that the FDCA does not generally preclude the
Lanham Act,179 yet they go one step farther to bar claims based on
pre-POM Wonderful principles of agency deference.180
For example, a few years before POM Wonderful, federal
courts agreed that some questions regarding the safety or efficacy
of medical devices and pharmaceuticals may be better resolved by
the FDA’s expertise.181 In POM Wonderful, the Supreme Court also
177. See id. at 2235 (pointing to the lack of legislative action establishing the
FDCA’s preclusion of the Lanham Act as evidence that the statutes should not
have such effect); see also supra Part II.B (outlining the holdings of Hynson and
Rutherford, which helped establish a strong judicial deference to the FDA).
178. See supra note 175 (providing examples of post-POM Wonderful cases
recognizing preclusion or otherwise dismissing claims based on deference to the
FDA).
179. See Par Sterile Prods., 2015 WL 1263041, at *4 (observing that as long
as the Lanham Act does not require a manufacturer to disobey an FDA
requirement, Section 43(a) claims will not be precluded); Catheter Connections,
2014 WL 3536573, at *6 (“[T]he simple fact that a matter touches upon an area
dealt with by the FDA is not a bar to proceedings with a claim under the Lanham
Act.” (quoting Pom Wonderful LLC v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 642 F. Supp.
2d 1112, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2009))).
180. See, e.g., Catheter Connections, 2014 WL 3536573, at *6 (relying on
PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin to dismiss the claim out of deference to the FDA’s
exclusive enforcement authority).
181. See PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010)
(acknowledging the FDA’s primary jurisdiction over FDCA violations);
Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 512
(7th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of a claim that would require the court to
interpret FDA regulations); Alpharma, Inc. v. Pennfield Oil Co., 411 F.3d 934,
939 (8th Cir. 2005) (declining to defer to the FDA, but recognizing that questions
requiring “expert consideration and uniformity of resolution” may necessitate
agency intervention (quoting United States v. McDonnell Douglass Corp., 751
F.2d 220, 224 (8th Cir. 1984))); PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105,
1113 (2d Cir. 1997) (denying the availability of Section 43(a) as a method to
enforce the FDCA); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding that Mylan could not independently enforce the FDCA through a
Section 43(a) claim); Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d
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recognized the potential for courts to undermine agency judgment
by failing to consider adequately the ramifications of overruling
agency action.182 Citing Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,183 the
Court explained that courts may bar an action if the ensuing
litigation would conflict with an agency’s affirmative policy
choice.184 Thus, while the Court’s holding broadly rejected
Coca-Cola’s theory of complete statutory preclusion, the Court
likely did not intend to prevent an FDA policy decision from
barring certain Lanham Act claims.185 Instead, the Court created
a presumption against preclusion that defendants in drug-related
Lanham Act actions may rebut by demonstrating that proper
resolution requires deference to FDA expertise.186 Since POM
Wonderful, courts have attempted to define exactly when FDA
actions should preclude Section 43(a) claims.187 In the next Part,
this Note analyzes the established methods of preclusion and
applies them to Section 43(a) claims involving promotion of
off-label drug uses in order to determine whether existing case law
would allow competitors to police off-label promotion through the
Lanham Act.188

222, 231 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[The cited cases] provide no support for the theory that
it is appropriate for a court in a Lanham Act case to determine preemptively how
a federal administrative agency will interpret and enforce its own regulations.”).
182. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2241 (2014)
(addressing the government’s claim that the FDA intended to provide flexibility
in labeling for food and drinks).
183. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
184. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2241 (stating that the court barred the
action in Geier because it “directly conflicted with the agency’s policy choice”).
185. See id. (suggesting that Geier’s holding may preclude future Lanham Act
claims that would require a court to undermine FDA judgments).
186. See JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1000 (C.D.
Cal 2014) (reasoning that the Court created a presumption against preclusion and
suggesting two ways of rebutting this presumption).
187. Compare infra note 190 (providing examples of situations in which courts
have allowed claims to continue), with supra note 181 (listing the reasons courts
have provided for precluding Lanham Act claims).
188. See infra Part IV (testing the ability of Section 43(a) claims involving offlabel promotion to survive the direct-conflict and usurpation approaches to
preclusion).
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IV. FDA Regulations Preclude Lanham Act Claims Challenging
Off-Label Promotion
Some courts have suggested that Lanham Act claims
challenging drug labels fall under a broad exception to the
Supreme Court’s holding in POM Wonderful, precluding them
altogether.189 For the most part, however, courts have allowed
Section 43(a) claims involving drugs so long as the resolution of
relevant issues does not require FDA expertise.190 Because the
FDA has assumed such a large role in prohibiting the promotion of
off-label drug uses, courts must now determine whether the FDA’s
involvement bars competitors’ claims of false or misleading
off-label advertising under Section 43(a).191
While courts have uniformly held that FDA drug regulation
may preclude Lanham Act claims after POM Wonderful, each court
tends to cite different reasons for such preclusion.192 In application,
however, several trends have emerged, suggesting that any
difference in language merely reflects the absence of a guiding

189. See, e.g., JHP Pharm., 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (suggesting that because
“the area of drug labeling was specifically singled out by the POM Wonderful
Court as being one where the FDA takes a particularly active role . . . drug
labeling might be an area where Lanham Act claims are precluded”).
190. See Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH,
843 F.3d 48, 73 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming the denial of defendant’s motion to
dismiss because the issue was whether advertising could be misunderstood, and
did not require FDA expertise to resolve); PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d
919, 924–25 (9th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that FDCA questions simple enough for
courts to resolve would not preclude private Lanham Act claims); see also JHP
Pharm., 52 F. Supp. 3d. at 1001 (“In this instance, it takes no special expertise to
determine whether the FDA has granted approval or not . . . .”).
191. See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 443 F. Supp. 2d
453, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (acknowledging the lack of a private right to enforce
off-label drugs under the FDCA, but allowing a Lanham Act claim to challenge
whether defendant’s advertising misleads consumers to believe the drug is safe
and effective for unapproved uses).
192. See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 64 (2d
Cir. 2016) (barring Lanham Act claims challenging statements consistent with
FDA-approved labeling); JHP Pharm., F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (suggesting that
primary jurisdiction, affirmative policy decision, conflict with an
FDA-preapproved labeling scheme, and potentially drug labels in general may
require preclusion); Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Med. Corp., No. 2:14-CV70-TC, 2014 WL 3536573, at *6 (D. Utah July 17, 2014) (leaving enforcement of
the FDCA to the FDA).
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authority on the issue.193 Two of these trends—barring direct
conflicts and usurpations of FDA authority—have received
particularly wide acceptance among courts applying POM
Wonderful in the context of drugs or medical devices.194
This Note first seeks to determine whether the current
approaches to FDA preclusion of Lanham Act claims effectively bar
competitors’ actions under Section 43(a).195 This inquiry alone
cannot provide a dispositive answer to the issue, however, as POM
Wonderful’s application to drug claims remains uncertain.196 Thus,
the Author also offers a general argument in favor of allowing
competitors to sue for unfair competition on the basis of off-label
promotion.197
A. Direct Conflict with FDA Policy Decisions
Though the Supreme Court declined to adopt a steadfast rule
for statutory preclusion in POM Wonderful, it suggested that a
193. See JHP Pharm., 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1000 n.5 (speculating as to what
portions of the Supreme Court’s dicta in POM Wonderful might clarify the Court’s
intention to preclude Section 43(a) claims involving drug labels and promotion).
The apparent confusion between the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and courts’
deference to the interpretation and enforcement powers of the FDA exemplifies
this difference in language. Compare id. at 1001 (discussing whether the primary
jurisdiction doctrine should require dismissal of such Lanham Act claims), with
Catheter Connections, 2014 WL 3536573, at *6 (precluding a claim based on
deference to the FDA’s sole enforcement authority). This Note will not attempt
the feat of expounding upon the differences between primary jurisdiction and
deference to the interpretation or enforcement powers of the FDA. See RICHARD
HENRY SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 753
(Michael Hunter Schwartz ed., 2013) (“Because primary jurisdiction is a rather
rare bird, some familiarity with the doctrine is the mark of a well-educated
administrative lawyer.”).
194. See JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1000 n.5 (C.D.
Cal 2014) (suggesting that a conflict with an agency’s policy decision, as in Geier,
would preclude a Lanham Act claim); Catheter Connections, 2014 WL 3536573, at
*6 (holding that the plaintiff’s first claim was precluded because it impermissibly
sought to enforce the FDCA).
195. See infra Parts IV.A–B (applying both methods of preclusion to Lanham
Act claims challenging the promotion of off-label drug uses).
196. See supra Part III.B (addressing a conflict between courts, which have
acknowledged various levels of preclusive effect, and scholars, who suggest a
broad application of POM Wonderful’s holding).
197. See infra Part V (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in POM
Wonderful should apply to off-label promotion).
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direct conflict between the FDCA and the Lanham Act would
create a preclusive effect.198 Similarly, the Court alluded to the
possibility that a direct conflict with an agency’s policy judgment
may also preclude actions under Section 43(a).199 Because the
Court has established that the FDCA and Lanham Act
complement each other, the former should not become an issue
unless Congress amends either act.200
As for when the Lanham Act conflicts with an FDA policy
judgment, however, the Court provides only superficial
guidance.201 In POM Wonderful, the Court uses the term “policy
judgment” merely to distinguish its precedent in Geier.202 After
suffering an injury in a car accident, the plaintiff in Geier sued
Honda for not installing an airbag in her 1987 automobile.203 The
Department of Transportation had promulgated a rule allowing
manufacturers to choose from a set of active and passive safety
measures that would meet the agency’s standards.204 Coca-Cola
argued that its pomegranate-blueberry juice similarly met
FDA-required safety and ingredient labeling standards.205 The
Court distinguished the two cases, however, by asserting that the
Department of Transportation made an affirmative decision to

198. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2237 (2014)
(observing that neither the Lanham Act nor the FDCA “forbids or limits Lanham
Act claims challenging labels that are regulated by the FDCA”); see also
MCCARTHY, supra note 65, § 27:65.50 (“Only if there is a direct conflict between a
clear mandate of FDCA regulation’s [sic] and Lanham Act enforcement would
there be a conflict.”).
199. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2241 (suggesting that a court could
bar a claim if the cause of action directly conflicts with an agency’s policy
judgment).
200. See id. at 2240 (“[N]either the statutory structure nor the empirical
evidence of which the Court is aware indicates there will be any difficulty in fully
enforcing each statute . . . .”).
201. See id. at 2241 (providing only a bare assertion that this case does not
undermine an agency judgment).
202. See id. (pointing to a lack of any affirmative policy choice by the FDA).
203. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–65 (2000) (bringing
suit under a state tort law).
204. See id. at 875 (outlining the intended progression of the Department of
Transportation’s Standard 208, which listed the available safety devices).
205. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2236 (addressing the district court’s
reasoning that the FDA “has not prohibited any, and indeed expressly has
permitted some, aspects of Coca-Cola’s label”).
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allow each of the safety measures, whereas the FDA merely set a
floor for the information required.206
Another more relevant example of a conflicting policy
judgment occurred before POM Wonderful in Schering-Plough
Healthcare Products v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc.207 Schering-Plough
Healthcare Products (Schering), which manufactured the
over-the-counter laxative “MiraLAX,” brought a Lanham Act suit
seeking to have the defendant manufacturers of similar generic
drugs remove the symbol “Rx only” from their products’ labels.208
Schering claimed that the symbol misled consumers who may
believe that all laxatives using the active ingredient polyethylene
glycol 3350 required a prescription.209 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of Schering’s claim because of a conflict
between Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and FDA regulations.210
Per FDA requirements, generic medications requiring
prescriptions must have the symbol “Rx only,” which would
prevent the court from granting Schering’s request to have it
removed.211
FDA preapproval alone should not suffice to disqualify a claim
under the Lanham Act, however, as the FDA allows manufacturers
to make minor or moderate changes to a product’s label after
approval so long as they subsequently notify the agency.212 While
the regulations permit only “editorial” label changes or changes
that strengthen consumer knowledge about a product—such as the
addition of warnings or removal of misleading information—POM
206. See id. at 2241 (explaining that the Department of Transportation
“deliberately” provided a choice to manufactures, rather than merely enacting a
flexible regulation).
207. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d
500, 503 (7th Cir. 2009) (involving a medication that was simultaneously
challenged in an FDA enforcement proceeding).
208. See id. at 502–03 (noting that all of the medications involved had the
same active ingredient of polyethylene glycol 3350 as well as the same dosage,
strength, and route of administration).
209. See id. at 503 (detailing Schering’s argument that the defendants’ labels
falsely claimed that polyethylene glycol was available by prescription only).
210. See id. at 510 (affirming dismissal without prejudice so that Schering
could refile depending on the results of the open FDA enforcement proceeding).
211. See id. (explaining that removing the symbol would constitute a “major”
change under FDA regulations, requiring further FDA approval).
212. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2016) (describing the notification requirements
for minor, moderate, and major drug label changes).
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Wonderful shows that a change as slight as font size may mislead
consumers.213 Additionally, as the Seventh Circuit explained in
Schering, “it might take years for the agency to get around to
prohibiting a misleading label.”214 Because an intervening change
to the label of an FDA-preapproved drug or medical device might
allow an unapproved label to enter the market, preapproval of a
product is likely necessary but not sufficient to establish a
preclusive effect.215 Furthermore, because promotion of off-label
uses exclusively involves benefits unapproved by the FDA, courts
should be unable to identify any conflicting policy decision.216
Proponents of preclusion would likely argue that the FDA’s
acknowledgement and acceptance of off-label prescribing evidence
an affirmative policy decision to allow such uses.217 Although the
allowance of Section 43(a) claims would certainly deter off-label
promotion, no direct conflict would exist unless the FDA adopted a
policy requiring off-label use of medications.218 Moreover, the
agency’s own criminal prohibition on the advertising of these
potential benefits opposes this theory.219 At best, the FDA has
213. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2014)
(focusing on the misleading nature of the font and vignette on Coca-Cola’s
pomegranate-blueberry juice).
214. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., 586 F.3d at 510.
215. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2240–41 (rejecting the government’s
argument that the FDA specifically requiring or authorizing aspects of a label
precludes a Lanham Act challenge to that label).
216. See JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1005 (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (considering that the lack of FDA approval might effectively remove a
product from the preclusion argument altogether).
217. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
FDA generally does not regulate how physicians use approved drugs.”); U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., FDA Drug Bulletin, 12 FDA DRUG BULL. 1, 5 (1982) (“Once a
product has been approved for marketing, a physician may prescribe it for uses
or in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not included in approved
labeling.”); see also “Off-Label” and Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs,
Biologics, and Medical Devices – Information Sheet, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm
(last
updated Jan. 25, 2016) (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (listing six conditions that
manufacturers must meet in order to begin clinical testing of an off-label use
without an Investigational New Drug Application) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
218. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2240 (suggesting that a conflict would
arise “only if the Lanham Act and the FDCA cannot be implemented in full at the
same time”).
219. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 155 (noting that the FDA has equated off-label
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mired its policy in contradiction by asserting the competing goals
of providing necessary medical treatment and limiting off-label
promotion.220 Thus, allowing competitors to bring Lanham Act
suits challenging the off-label promotion of drugs will create a
vehicle complementary to, not in conflict with, the FDA’s
affirmative policy choice to prohibit this advertising.
B. Usurpation of FDA Authority
Because the FDCA lacks a private cause of action, competitors
often seek to enforce FDCA provisions through Section 43(a) suits
or bring claims that require interpretation of the FDCA or FDA
regulations.221 Courts have agreed, however, that “a private action
brought under the Lanham Act may not be pursued when . . . the
claim would require litigation of the alleged underlying FDCA
violation in a circumstance where the FDA has not itself concluded
that there was such a violation.”222 Additionally, “claims that
require direct interpretation and application of the FDCA are not
properly recognized because such matters are appropriately
addressed by the FDA, especially in light of Congress’s intention
to repose in that body the task of enforcing the FDCA.”223
Consequently, before the Supreme Court decided POM Wonderful,
courts typically disallowed Section 43(a) suits in which plaintiffs
sought indirectly to enforce the FDCA or where courts would have
to apply or interpret the FDCA—functions reserved to the FDA.224
marketing with misbranding, which is illegal under the FDCA).
220. See id. at 166 (“[T]he government asserts an interest in preserving the
effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s drug approval process, and an interest
in reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.”).
221. See Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Stratus Pharm., 273 F. Supp. 2d 769, 786 (W.D.
Tex. 2001) (“[C]ourts have held not only that a plaintiff may not seek to enforce
directly the FDCA through the Lanham Act but also that a plaintiff may not
maintain a Lanham Act claim if the claim requires direct application or
interpretation of the FDCA or FDA regulations.”).
222. PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010).
223. Cottrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol Int’l, Inc., 191 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Nephro-Tech, Inc., No. 96-2459-JWL, 1997 WL
94237, at *6 (D. Kan. Feb. 26, 1997)).
224. See, e.g., PhotoMedex, 601 F.3d at 924 (finding that plaintiff could not
privately enforce the FDCA); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1139 (4th
Cir. 1993) (same). Although interpreting and enforcing are arguably different
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Since POM Wonderful, courts have continued to recognize that
attempts to enforce the FDCA through Lanham Act claims might
be precluded.225 Typically, defendants must show that the court
would have to engage not only in fact finding, but also
interpretation or application of the FDCA.226 For example, in
PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin,227 PhotoMedex, Inc. filed suit against Ra
Medical Systems, Inc. (RMS) for claiming that the FDA had
cleared its excimer laser228 for marketing.229 Rather, RMS had
received the manufacturing rights for the laser from SurgiLight,
another developer that had received FDA 510(k) clearance for its
design.230 Before filing a Lanham Act suit, PhotoMedex, Inc. filed
a complaint with the FDA reporting RMS for marketing a new
functions, the intertwined nature of the two actions necessitate simultaneous
consideration. For example, suppose that MedInc markets a medication as “safe
and effective” without FDA approval under the grandfather clause of the FDCA.
Pharmaco introduces a new medication that has the same medical indications,
but that has received preapproval from the FDA. Rather than submitting a citizen
petition to the FDA, Pharmaco sues MedInc for advertising its drug as “safe and
effective.” Pharmaco would, in effect, ask the court to enforce the FDCA by
seeking to invoke the section of the statute that requires the FDA to determine
the safety and effectiveness of new medications. In order to make such a
determination, however, the FDA must interpret the FDCA to decide what level
of safety and effectiveness to require. As such, in order to decide the claim on its
merits, the court would have to both enforce and interpret the FDCA.
225. See, e.g., Innovative Health Sols., Inc. v. DyAnsys, Inc., No. 14-cv-05207SI, 2015 WL 2398931, at *6–8 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2015) (recognizing the FDA’s
sole authority over FDCA enforcement); Par Sterile Prods., LLC v. Fresenius Kabi
USA LLC, No. 14 C 3349, 2015 WL 1263041, at *4 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2015)
(noting that POM Wonderful left open the possibility “that a Lanham Act claim
might be precluded in certain cases that fall within the exclusive purview of the
FDA”); JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 997–1000 (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (providing a detailed analysis for future preclusion of Lanham Act
claims).
226. See Innovative Health Sols., 2015 WL 2398931, at *7 (holding that the
plaintiff’s claim over misuse of an FDA clearance number did not circumvent FDA
enforcement when the FDA had already spoken on the issue); Par Sterile Prods.,
2015 WL 1263041, at *4 n.5 (noting that litigating the fact of FDA approval does
not require FDA expertise).
227. 601 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2010).
228. See id. at 922, 925 (explaining that excimer lasers are Class II medical
devices used to treat skin disorders).
229. See id. at 923 (“Defendants distributed a brochure which proclaimed that
Ra Medical’s [laser] was ‘FDA Approved . . . .’”).
230. See id. at 922 (noting that SurgiLight gave RMS manufacturing rights
in exchange for royalties).
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product without 510(k) clearance.231 Noting that the FDA
investigated RMS and failed to determine that the new design
required further clearance, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for lack of standing.232 The
court reasoned that “PhotoMedex is not permitted to circumvent
the FDA’s exclusive enforcement authority by seeking to prove
that Defendants violated the FDCA, when the FDA did not reach
that conclusion.”233 Further, the court recognized that “[t]esting
the truth of PhotoMedex’s claim would . . . require a court to usurp
the FDA’s prerogative to enforce the FDCA” because it would
require interpretation of the statute.234
In Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Medical Corp.,235 the
District of Utah attempted to provide further clarity and guidance
for determining when a claim usurps the FDA’s enforcement
authority.236 There, the court held that the plaintiff improperly
sought to bring a claim under the FDCA, explaining, “The initial
decision [that its device was covered by Section 510(k) clearance of
a similar device] lay in Ivera’s hands. If that decision was wrong,
the next step lies with the FDA, which may enforce the section and
require a new submission by Ivera.”237 Conversely, the court
allowed Catheter Connections’ remaining claims to proceed,
reasoning that the challenges were fact-based, rather than an
“interpretation or application of FDA policy or regulatory
requirements.”238
Typically, claims that fall into the category of “seeking to
enforce the FDCA” resemble attempts to circumvent the FDA’s
enforcement authority.239 As the Ninth Circuit explained in
231. See id. at 926 (“The issue was presented to the FDA, but it does not
appear that the agency ever reached the conclusion sought by PhotoMedex.”).
232. See id. at 923 (stating that the district court granted summary judgment
because the FDA has “exclusive jurisdiction over FDCA enforcement”).
233. Id. at 928.
234. Id.
235. No. 2:14-CV-70-TC, 2014 WL 3536573 (D. Utah July 17, 2014).
236. See id. at *5–7 (distinguishing between interpretation of the FDCA and
fact finding).
237. Id. at *6.
238. See id. at *7 (suggesting that requiring the court to inquire into the
nature of the product, rather than interpret the FDCA, distinguished the
remaining claims).
239. See, e.g., PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010)
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PhotoMedex, the enforcement issue arises when “the claim would
require litigation of the alleged underlying FDCA violation.”240
Because the FDA has sought to prohibit nearly all instances of
off-label promotion, any challenge to such promotion under Section
43(a) would resemble a private attempt to enforce the FDA’s
prohibition.241 Thus, it appears that the current preclusion
jurisprudence might completely bar Lanham Act claims
challenging off-label promotion, as competitors would inevitably
usurp the FDA’s enforcement power.242
V. A Return to POM Wonderful: Allowing Enforcement Through
Section 43(a)
Although courts often bar Section 43(a) claims under the
current preclusion framework, they should create an exception for
off-label drug promotion. Two considerations support this idea.
First, the regulation of off-label promotion more closely resembles
a function of the Lanham Act’s protection against unfair
competition than the FDCA’s protection of public health and safety
against adulterated drugs.243 Applying POM Wonderful, then,
neither the FDCA nor its accompanying FDA regulations should
bar Section 43(a) claims.244 Second, the FDA has asserted two
competing governmental interests in its attempts to regulate
off-label promotion, which courts and the agency alike have had

(noting that the court would not allow PhotoMedex’s claim when the FDA already
determined there was no violation of the FDCA’s provisions regarding FDA
clearance).
240. Id.
241. See supra Part III.B (discussing the FDA’s attempts to prosecute even
truthful promotion under the FDCA’s misbranding provisions).
242. See Minerd, supra note 157 (interpreting the FDA’s latest guidance
memorandum as merely “set[ing] forth the Agency’s justification for their current
restrictions on off-label promotion”).
243. See Bi, supra note 123, at 999 (recommending the FDA adopt the same
definition of “false or misleading” as the Lanham Act for evaluating off-label
speech because the agency’s off-label promotion regulations so closely resemble
false advertising regulations).
244. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014)
(noting that the Lanham Act, and not the FDCA, focuses on protecting
commercial interests against unfair competition).
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difficulty balancing.245 Lanham Act claims, however, rely on
certain assumptions that will ultimately help balance the FDA’s
conflicting goals, “tak[ing] advantage of synergies among multiple
methods of regulation” to support the FDA’s interests in
maintaining validity of its NDA process and protecting public
health and safety.246 Thus, returning to the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in POM Wonderful provides an answer for the instant
regulatory dilemma—the Lanham Act complements the FDCA and
FDA regulations. Deference to the FDA may occasionally mandate
the preclusion of Section 43(a) claims, but that preclusion should
not extend to disputes concerning the promotion of medications for
off-label uses.
A. Off-Label Promotion is Unfair Competition
Viewing off-label promotion through the lens of POM
Wonderful and its progeny, it appears that a private right of action
to prevent misleading advertisement falls squarely under the
scope of Section 43(a) as the regulation of unfair competition.247
And, while off-label advertising certainly affects public health and
safety so as also to implicate the FDCA, the Supreme Court in
POM Wonderful explicitly relied upon the Lanham Act’s distinct
and complementary purpose to hold that the FDCA did not
preclude claims under Section 43(a).248 Courts have largely
distinguished POM Wonderful’s holding when deciding Section
43(a) claims involving pharmaceuticals based on the FDA’s
regulation of those products through premarket approval.249 But,
245. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) (weighing
the FDA’s interests in preserving the NDA process and reducing marketing of
unsafe products against the FDA’s allowance of off-label use and the ability to
make informed treatment decisions).
246. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2239.
247. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“The intent of this chapter is to . . . protect
persons engaged in [interstate] commerce against unfair competition . . . .”); POM
Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2233–34 (describing the intent and purpose of the
Lanham Act).
248. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238 (“Although both statutes touch
on . . . labeling, the Lanham Act protects commercial interests against unfair
competition, while the FDCA protects public health and safety.”).
249. See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 64 (2d
Cir. 2016) (“[A]n FDA label generally cannot form the basis for Lanham Act
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regardless of whether POM Wonderful’s “complementary” holding
applies to products preapproved by the FDA, off-label promotion
concerns exclusively unapproved uses of medications.250 Thus, the
fact that the FDA sought to criminalize off-label promotion under
the FDCA should not preclude similar civil claims under the
Lanham Act.251
As Professor O’Reilly suggests, the FDA holds a unique quality
as a government agency, departing from the typical approach to
“agencies as vehicles for populist control of an important aspect of
the economy.”252 Rather, the agency’s founders sought to provide
an administration of “passionate consumer advocates who used the
power of a dispassionate scientific approach to address safety
issues.”253
In
fact,
this
scientific-expertise-based
and
consumer-oriented approach helped establish the deference to the
FDA with which courts often treat matters arising under the
FDCA.254 As a result, public safety depends on the FDA’s NDA
process, the validity of which the agency has sought to protect
through its prohibition of off-label promotion.255 But, the agency
further identifies a contradictory goal, which highlights its
inability to pinpoint the best regulatory approach to this
problem.256
During its litigation of First Amendment challenges, the FDA
asserted that it indirectly banned off-label promotion for public
liability.”); JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1005 (C.D. Cal.
2014) (“POM Wonderful suggested, at least obliquely, that drug labeling might be
an area where Lanham Act claims are precluded.”).
250. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 152 (defining off-label promotion as being “for
a purpose not approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration”).
251. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2239 (“A holding that the FDCA
precludes Lanham Act claims . . . would lead to a result that Congress likely did
not intend.”).
252. O’Reilly, supra note 41, at 948.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 949 (crediting the FDA’s “reputation for superior science and
expertise” as the reason for courts’ willingness to give deference to the agency).
255. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012)
(recognizing that the government’s “interest in preserving the effectiveness and
integrity of the FDCA’s drug approval process” is substantial).
256. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 369–70 (2002)
(discussing the difficulty of drawing the line between protecting the FDCA’s
approval process and the continuing need to provide appropriate treatment
through drug compounding).
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health and safety, while also conceding the importance of
maintaining access to drugs for off-label use.257 For that reason,
the agency has not criminalized the prescribing or use of drugs for
unapproved uses, but solely their promotion.258 Consequently, the
FDA’s attempt to criminalize off-label promotion does not so much
serve the FDCA’s purpose of protecting public health and safety
from adulterated medications as it does the Lanham Act’s purpose
of preventing unfair competition. Rather, the pecuniary incentive
that Section 43(a) creates for competitors would provide a more
appropriate avenue for preventing the unfair advertising.259
Although Professors O’Reilly and Van Tassel correctly contend
that the FDA will provide necessary control over pharmaceutical
companies’ greed,260 that same greed provides competing
manufacturers with a compelling incentive to regulate off-label
promotion.261 Indeed, while the FDA permits citizens to petition for
257. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 153 (“Off-label use is an ‘accepted and necessary
corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate in this area without directly interfering
with the practice of medicine.’” (quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm.,
531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001))).
258. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 217, at 5 (allowing off-label
prescribing of unapproved drug uses); see also 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012) (“Nothing
in this Act shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health
care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a
patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care
practitioner-patient relationship.”).
259. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238–39
(2014) (“By ‘serv[ing] a distinct compensatory function that may motivate injured
persons to come forward,’ Lanham Act suits, to the extent they touch on the same
subject matter as the FDCA, ‘provide incentives’ for manufacturers to behave
well.” (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555, U.S. 555, 579 (2009))). The FDCA also allows
the FDA to fine manufacturers for criminal violations of the statute’s
misbranding provisions, but these punishments still lack the monetary reward
that entices competing manufacturers to help police off-label promotion. See 21
U.S.C. § 333 (punishing criminal violations of the FDCA’s misbranding provisions
with potential fines of up to $1 million after the second offense in ten years).
260. See O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 31, § 3:2 (“Whether regulatory
enforcement can control greed is an issue debated to this day in the food and drug
regulation field. Good faith on the part of the manufacturers is a necessary ideal
but until that perfect world can be achieved, a strong [FDA] is justified.”).
261. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238
The FDA, however, does not have the same perspective or expertise in
assessing market dynamics that day-to-day competitors possess.
Competitors who manufacture or distribute products have detailed
knowledge regarding how consumers rely upon certain sales and
marketing strategies. Their awareness of unfair competition practices
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enforcement, it lacks the pecuniary interest that Section 43(a)
provides to competitors who might have better knowledge about
competing drugs.262
Additionally, POM Wonderful suggested that barring Lanham
Act claims might require the FDA to spread its resources too thin,
preventing the agency from fully enforcing its regulations.263
Admittedly, POM Wonderful concerned food and beverage
regulations, which, as the Supreme Court acknowledged, receive
much less attention than drug regulations.264 Nonetheless, the
Court counseled against preclusion, in part because competitors
have greater resources to challenge misleading advertising.265
Potential fluctuations in FDA resources and enforcement following
changes in the executive branch also warrant a backstop in the
form of Lanham Act liability.266 For example, at the time this Note
was written, President Trump’s leading candidate to head the FDA
supported a drastic decline in the NDA process and other
safeguards that could result in unsafe drugs reaching the
market.267 As the Supreme Court stated in POM Wonderful, “[t]his
may be far more immediate and accurate than that of agency
rulemakers and regulators. Lanham Act suits draw upon this market
expertise by empowering private parties to sue competitors to protect
their interests on a case-by-case basis.
262. See id. at 2238–39 (noting that the Lanham Act provides incentives for
competing manufacturers to help regulate market practices otherwise regulated
by the FDCA).
263. See id. at 2239 (implying that the FDA lacks the resources to pursue
enforcement regarding all objectionable labels).
264. See id. (recognizing that the FDA does not preapprove food and beverage
labels like it does drug labels).
265. See id. at 2238 (“The FDA, however, does not have the same perspective
or expertise in assessing market dynamics that day-to-day competitors possess.”).
266. See O’Reilly, supra note 41, at 959–62, 977 (observing that the executive
branch has enormous discretion over the NDA process, and arguing that a
renewed FDA independence would help the agency regain deference); see also
John D. Loike & Jennifer Miller, Opinion: Improving FDA Evaluation Without
Jeopardizing Safety and Efficacy, SCIENTIST (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.thescientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/48280/title/Opinion--Improving-FDAEvaluations-Without-Jeopardizing-Safety-and-Efficacy/ (last visited Feb. 18,
2018) (considering what changes a new head of the FDA would bring to the
agency’s NDA process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
267. See Drew Armstrong et al., Trump Team Said to Consider Thiel Associate
O’Neill for FDA, BLOOMBERG POL. (Dec. 7, 2016, 12:01 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-12-07/trump-team-is-said-toconsider-thiel-associate-o-neill-for-fda (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“In a 2014
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is quite consistent with the congressional design to enact two
different statutes, each with its own mechanisms to enhance the
protection of competitors and consumers.”268
B. Section 43(a) Claims Will Protect the FDA’s Stated Interests
Since its inception in the 1930s, the FDA has faced the difficult
task of pursuing the FDCA’s goal of protecting public health and
safety from adulterated drugs.269 Successful administration of its
own strict standards for new drugs and clinical testing, however,
has led to a new dilemma. Protecting public safety requires the
continuation of the NDA process that has ensured safe and
effective treatment and increased monitoring of dangerous
medications.270 But, public health may require treatment options
that lack FDA approval—possibly because a drug lacked
insufficient supporting data from clinical trials for a particular use
at the NDA stage, or because the FDA determined that the
potential side effects outweighed the benefits and declined to grant
approval.271 In either case, the requirements of Section 43(a) will
incidentally lead to an appropriate balancing of the FDA’s end
goals.

speech, he said he supported reforming FDA approval rules so that drugs could
hit the market after they’ve been proven safe, but without any proof that they
worked, something he called ‘progressive approval.’”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Loike & Miller, supra note 266 (“O’Neill has publicly
proposed eliminating the FDA’s requirement for Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials, in an
effort to lower drug development costs.”).
268. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2239 (2014).
269. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938) (providing that the act’s purpose is to protect the public from
misbranding).
270. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012)
(recognizing that the FDA’s interest in preserving its NDA process is
“substantial”).
271. See id. at 153 (“[O]ff-label uses or treatment regimens may be important
and may even constitute a medically[-]recognized standard of care.” (alterations
in original) (quoting U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE, GOOD REPRINT
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR
SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED
DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES 3 (2009))).
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1. Maintaining Validity of the NDA Process

Section 43(a), by dissuading competitors from placing a drug
on the market for an unapproved and unintended use, exemplifies
the complementary nature of the Lanham Act and FDCA praised
by the Supreme Court in POM Wonderful.272 Under this scheme,
manufacturers must choose either to promote a newly discovered
off-label use—and face the threat of paying monetary damages to
their competitors—or to put that money toward a supplemental
application for FDA approval.273 Moreover, if manufacturers face
both civil liability to their competitors and criminal liability
through the FDA, the cost of any misleading promotion
increases.274
Granted, the reported estimates of bringing a new drug to the
market might seem exorbitant, but pharmaceutical companies
often include the cost of research in these estimates.275
Significantly, the truthful marketing of drugs for off-label purposes
presupposes the existence of efficacy data for the medications.276
272. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238–39 (finding the Lanham Act and
FDCA to be complementary because they serve different functions with
overlapping subject matter).
273. Compare J. SHAWN MCGRATH & KATHLEEN M. KEDROWSKI, DAMAGES
TRENDS
IN
PATENT
AND
LANHAM
ACT
CASES
9,
http://apps.
americanbar.org/litigation/committees/corporate/docs/2010-cle-materials/05-hottopics-ip-remedies-injunctions/05b-damages-trends-ga-bar.pdf (showing that the
average award for false advertising cases from 2004 and 2008 was between $2.5–
3 million, with the largest damages award being over $16 million), with Standard
Costs (in Thousands of Dollars) for Components of the Process for the Review of
Human
Drug
Applications,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm0934
84.htm (last updated Oct. 2, 2017) (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (listing the average
cost of new drug application with clinical data at about $1.8 million, and the cost
of a supplement with clinical data at about $473,000 in 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
274. See 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2012) (punishing manufacturers who violate the
FDCA’s misbranding provisions with fines from fifty thousand to one million
dollars).
275. See A. Gordon Smith, Price Gouging and the Dangerous New Breed of
Pharma Companies, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 6, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/pricegouging-and-the-dangerous-new-breed-of-pharma-companies (last visited Feb.
18, 2018) (estimating the price of research and development to be anywhere from
millions of dollars to over $2.6 billion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
276. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a)(1) (noting that clinical data is not false or
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Thus, regardless of whether manufacturers market an approved or
off-label use, the vast majority of effective marketing will require
testing and efficacy data.277 The availability of Section 43(a) will
not limit a pharmaceutical company’s ability to gather real-world
clinical data, however, as long as the company clearly disclaims
the insufficiency of supporting efficacy and safety information as
part of the advertising.278 After Amarin, companies may disclaim
a drug’s risks and lack of FDA approval to promote truthfully an
off-label use and avoid Lanham Act liability.279 In effect, this would
allow companies to promote an off-label use and receive clinical
data from treatment results instead of paying for additional
testing. By contrast, then, companies could potentially pay less to
submit a new use to the FDA than to face civil liability from their
competitors.280
Arguably, this could lead to an increase in healthcare costs,
rather than an increase in NDAs.281 Instead of deterring off-label
promotion, pharmaceutical companies might continue their
current practice of merely passing the price of litigation on to
consumers.282 Any increase in price due to litigation costs of claims
arising under the Lanham Act, however, presupposes the
misleading if it “is based on competent and reliable scientific evidence”).
277. See Hampton, supra note 111, at 683 (stating that physicians prescribing
off-label uses “have the responsibility to be well-informed about the product, to
base its use on firm scientific rationale and on sound medical advice”).
278. See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d
196, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (allowing Amarin to promote its medication based on the
transparency of the advertisements and disclosures).
279. See id. (identifying a method by which to avoid liability under Section
43(a)).
280. See supra note 273 (comparing the price of Lanham Act damages to the
price of FDA approval).
281. See Elizabeth Richardson, Health Policy Brief: Off-Label Drug
Promotion,
HEALTHAFFAIRS
(June
30,
2016),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20160630.920075/full/
(last
visited Mar. 4, 2018) (“[P]reventing a manufacturer from communicating about
an off-label use or the comparative value of its products might . . . increase health
costs.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
282. See Trisha Marczak, Multimillion-Dollar Settlement for Misleading
Consumers: Just Another Day at Pfizer, MINTPRESS NEWS (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.mintpressnews.com/pfizer-settlement-misleadingconsumers/166292/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“[W]hen it comes to paying for
costs associated with lawsuits and settlements against drug makers, consumers
are likely to carry the tab.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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availability of some alternative drug for the same treatment—a
drug company cannot successfully bring a claim under the Lanham
Act unless it has suffered losses from a competing product.283 If a
company hikes the price of their drug to pass litigation costs on to
its consumers, then those consumers have the option of purchasing
medications from the competitor, whose product likely received
approval from the FDA.284 As a result, the availability of Lanham
Act claims should provide incentives for manufacturers to seek
FDA approval for their supplemental uses.
2. Balancing Necessary Treatments with a Potential for
Dangerous Side Effects
Both the FDCA and the Lanham Act seek to protect
consumers—the FDCA from adulterated or misbranded drugs, and
the Lanham Act from unfair competition.285 Since the FDA began
interpreting off-label promotion as evidence of misbranding,
however, the two statutes largely coincide.286 As POM Wonderful
suggests, despite the difference in legislative intent, the FDCA and
Lanham Act provide distinct and complementary avenues to
protect consumers from both unfair competition and adulterated
or misbranded drugs.287 By focusing on unfair competition, the
Lanham Act supports the FDCA in the area of off-label promotion

283. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390
(2014) (requiring that a plaintiff fall within the “zone of interest” by asserting loss
to either their reputation, or sales as a result of the defendant’s acts).
284. See Richardson, supra note 281 (“Rising prescription drug costs have led
to an increased emphasis on the comparative value of treatments on the
market . . . which allows individuals to assess the price of a given drug relative to
its value.”).
285. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“The intent of this chapter is to . . . protect
persons engaged in [interstate] commerce against unfair competition . . . .”);
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(“To prohibit the movement in interstate commerce of adulterated and
misbranded food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, and for other purposes.”).
286. See Perez v. Nidek Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1166 (S.D. Cal. 2009)
(drawing a parallel between plaintiff’s off-label claims and the FDA’s enforcement
of off-label claims).
287. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014)
(“The two statutes impose ‘different requirements and protections.’” (quoting
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593, 605 (2001))).
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where FDA regulation may decrease access to necessary treatment
options.288
a. Section 43(a) Does Not Limit Access to Necessary Treatments
Often patients rely on off-label treatments as options of last
resort, whether because other treatments have failed, or because
no medication specifically targets a particular illness.289 For
example, the story of Lisa Rosendahl shows that off-label uses can
treat rare or otherwise incurable conditions—an important reason
not to prevent access to information about off-label options.290
Where the FDA seeks to limit off-label promotion in all instances,
however, the Lanham Act likely would not prevent access to
treatment options in either of these situations.
In order to prove a prima facie case under Section 43(a), a
competitor must show losses by demonstrating that sales of its own
product decreased because of unfair competition.291 Rosendahl’s
tumor did not respond to traditional treatment options, which her
doctors exhausted before moving on to the experimental use of
chloroquine.292 Hypothetically, then, if the manufacturer of the
chloroquine used to help Rosendahl sought to promote this newly
discovered use of its drug, the companies selling traditional
treatments could not establish a prima facie case under the
Lanham Act. The existing treatments serve a different function
medically, by targeting glioblastomas directly rather than
preventing autophagy as chloroquine did.293 Moreover, Rosendahl
288. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating
that the FDA’s regulation of off-label promotion “interferes with the ability of
physicians and patients to receive potentially relevant treatment information”).
289. See Hampton, supra note 111, at 683 (reporting that up to 75% of all
cancer drugs are used for off-label treatments, and 90% of rare diseases are
treated with off-label medications).
290. See Dovey, supra note 7 (noting that Rosendahl’s doctors used
chloroquine on a “hunch,” and not based on an approved use).
291. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390
(2014) (explaining that unfair competition “was understood to be concerned with
injuries to business reputation and present and future sales”).
292. See Dovey, supra note 7 (“[H]er brain tumor proved unresponsive to all
known treatments.”).
293. See id. (indicating that the doctors knew chloroquine could prevent
autophagy, the process “used by many brain cancers to help them avoid
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still required traditional medications, as the chloroquine merely
increased the existing drugs’ effects.294 As a result, the competitor
would lack the damage and causation required by Section 43(a).295
Taking a broader look, Lanham Act claims likely cannot
succeed in challenging the off-label promotion of drugs for
treatment of rare or otherwise untreatable illnesses.
Pharmaceutical companies typically focus on profitable
medications, often choosing to ignore rare conditions in pursuit of
drugs that will sell more consistently.296 Thus, a doctor prescribing
an off-label use to a patient who suffers from a rare disease likely
does so, at least in part, because no other options exist.297 If the
manufacturer of that drug then seeks to promote the medication’s
newly discovered use, it will have no competitors to bring suit
under Section 43(a) because other pharmaceutical companies have
not sought to develop treatments for such a rare condition.298
Even if another treatment option exists, the off-label use of
drugs as last-ditch efforts often follows exhaustion of existing
treatments, like in the case of Rosendahl.299 In those situations,
treatment”).
294. See id. (“[W]ithout its greatest defense, the tumor would be more
vulnerable to traditional treatments used to destroy it.”).
295. See Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1390 (requiring a plaintiff to establish
proximate cause under Section 43(a)).
296. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Innovation and the Orphan Drug Act, 1983–
2009: Regulatory and Clinical Characteristics of Approved Orphan Drugs, in
RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS: ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT 291, 291 (Marilyn J. Field & Thomas F. Boat eds., 2010) (“If a
disease affects a limited number of patients and does not allow recovery of private
research investment, then therapeutic products for that condition may be
developed slowly or not at all.”). But see id. at 292 (explaining that the Orphan
Drug Act of 1983 sought to encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop
treatments for rare diseases).
297. See Robert H. Pritchard, Off-Label Uses of Approved Drugs: A New
Compromise is Needed, LEDA HARV. L. SCH., https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream
/handle/1/8965544/rpritcha.html?sequence=2 (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“In
some situations, an off-label prescription is the only treatment available to a
patient, . . . because a more targeted drug is [sic] does not exist . . . .”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
298. See Stafford, supra note 111, at 1427 (recognizing that off-label uses may
be the only treatments available for “orphan” (rare) conditions).
299. See Pritchard, supra note 297 (suggesting that an off-label treatment
might be the only option when “other methods of treatment are ineffective or
unavailable to patient intolerance”).
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the off-label treatment most likely applies a different medical
approach to the problem and, therefore, does not take profits from
other companies’ products.300 If a doctor decides that an
experimental or newly discovered off-label treatment may better
suit their patients than existing treatments, then companies with
competing products might have standing under Section 43(a).301
But, that ultimately serves the FDA’s purpose of eliminating
dangerous off-label treatments, as discussed below.
b. Section 43(a) Will Help Eliminate Dangerous Off-Label
Treatments
The FDA’s NDA process weeds out potentially dangerous
drugs, while granting approval to those found safe and effective for
particular treatments.302 Often a denial of approval may result
from insufficient data or a risky side effect.303 Consequently, the
agency may approve a drug for only one of a number of potential
treatments, balancing the potential risks with the benefits for each
indicated condition.304 This weighing process leads to the approval
of drugs like many chemotherapeutic agents—necessary for the
treatment of several cancers, but with potentially painful and fatal
side effects.305 On the other end of the spectrum, a nighttime cough
medicine might be approved as a decongestant, while the potential
300. See Wittich et al., supra note 112, at 982 (noting that doctors might resort
to “any treatment that is logical and available” to treat life-threatening
conditions).
301. See id. (acknowledging that doctors may prescribe drugs that fall in the
same class as other common treatments, even if those drugs have not received
approval for the same indications).
302. See Sacks et al., supra note 12, at 379 (claiming that rejection of an NDA
helps keep ineffective or harmful drugs off the market).
303. See id. at 380–82 (listing common reasons for delay or denial of an NDA).
304. See Wittich et al., supra note 112, at 982 (discussing how drugs may lack
evidence of efficacy for a particular class of patients, leading to FDA approval of
the studied class only).
305. See Jeff Roberts, The Most Dangerous & Heavily Promoted Prescription
Drugs & Their Potential Natural Alternatives, COLLECTIVE EVOLUTION (Oct. 14,
2014), http://www.collective-evolution.com/2014/10/14/the-most-dangerous-heavilypromoted-prescription-drugs-possible-natural-alternatives/ (last visited Feb. 18,
2018) (stating that chemotherapeutic agents may cause liver and kidney toxicity,
lung disease, problems with immune systems and bone marrow, and could lead
to death) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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negative effects of long-term use prevent its approval as a sleep
aid.306 Nobody would suggest that cough syrup poses more of a
threat to health than a chemotherapeutic agent, but when weighed
against the benefits of an extra hour of sleep or the treatment of
cancer, respectively, the risk of the cough medicine’s side effects
likely does not outweigh the benefit.
Here, the Lanham Act’s requirements provide balanced
regulation of off-label claims by allowing well-established off-label
use to continue, while providing an avenue to challenge
unsupported off-label promotion. Competitors might have
standing under Section 43(a) in cases where drugs lack sufficient
clinical support for the claims made during advertising, but if
scientific clinical trials support the efficacy and safety of an
off-label use then the medical community, not the manufacturer,
often promotes that use.307 The FDA has even provided guidance
for when Continuing Medication Education programs are
sufficiently independent from pharmaceutical companies to allow
discussion of off-label uses.308
In cases where the medical community, and not a
manufacturer, provides “statements of scientific conclusions about
unsettled matters of scientific debate,”309 the First Amendment
protects the dissemination of efficacy information, even from
private actions under the Lanham Act. Presumably, if the medical
community has endorsed a particular use, then medical
professionals have witnessed the potential risks and benefits and
formed their own opinion that the off-label use is sufficiently safe
and effective.310 Doctors and patients will then continue to receive
supporting data for well-established, off-label treatment options

306. See Park et al., supra note 11, at 226 (“In general, [antihistamines] are
not FDA-approved for the treatment of insomnia, though their use is supported
by a large body of patient and clinical experience.”).
307. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 1998)
(identifying sources the FDA has allowed to disseminate information about
off-label uses, like textbooks, medical colleagues, and educational programs).
308. See id. at 57 (providing twelve factors to determine whether education
programs are “independent”).
309. ONY Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 492 (2d Cir.
2013).
310. See id. at 497 (explaining that where an opinion is based on truthful and
nonmisleading scientific discourse, it is protected).
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even without promotion by the manufacturer.311 Conversely, if
competitors can show that a pharmaceutical company has a role in
promotion, and that the claims have misled consumers, such
advertising might give rise to liability under the Lanham Act.312
As such, availability of Section 43(a) to challenge off-label
promotion should not eliminate necessary or widely beneficial
off-label drug use and promotion. Rather, it should effectively
regulate manufacturers’ claims of experimental or secondary uses
that have yet to receive proper attention in clinical trials.
VI. Conclusion
Both the Lanham Act and the FDCA seek to “protect
consumers,” albeit within different spheres of the law and through
distinct means. Yet, while Congress and the Supreme Court have
allowed the statutes to continue working in tandem to support a
unified goal, lower courts have nonetheless found that questions of
law requiring FDA expertise often bar Lanham Act claims
challenging a drug’s label. The problem remains that although the
FDA deserves deference in regulating drug products, the agency’s
limited resources prevent it from effectively protecting public
health from false or misleading off-label promotion on its own.
Instead, courts should follow POM Wonderful and allow
competitors to help police off-label promotion with Section 43(a)
claims. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in POM Wonderful,
the Lanham Act creates an incentive for competitors to police false
or misleading marketing and would not conflict with the FDA’s
goals. Rather, Section 43(a) complements the FDA’s regulations by
ensuring access to necessary treatment, reducing the prevalence of
dangerous off-label use, and maintaining the validity of the FDA’s
NDA process. As such, POM Wonderful stands for the proposition
that the best approach to eliminating false or misleading off-label
promotion requires the FDCA to work in conjunction with

311. See Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (assuring that
manufacturers still may not distribute certain off-label promotional materials
even though the medical community may recognize a use).
312. See id. (limiting the court’s holding to allow dissemination only through
“independent program providers”).
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pharmaceutical companies that use Section 43(a) to challenge
unfair competition.

